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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
ment instruction.9 6 The Henry decision specifically prohibits the testimony of
informants paid by the government. 7
The informant in Thomas v. Cox voluntarily provided authorities with
incriminating statements made by a fellow inmate.98 The Thomas court's
analysis focused on whether the informant was a government agent or a volun-
tary witness.9 9 The court's conclusion that the informant was not a govern-
ment agent garners implicit support from United States v. Henry and is con-
sistent with other circuit court decisions.' 00 Prosecutors and defense attorneys
in the Fourth Circuit should continue to rely on Henry to gauge the admissibility
of a prison informant's testimony.'' Unless the informant interacts with the
government in a way that establishes an agency relationship, the Henry pro-
hibition will not apply.' 2 In Thomas, the Fourth Circuit correctly refrained
from sanctioning an unjustified extension of the sixth amendment right to
counsel as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Henry.
RONALD THOMAS BEVANS, JR.
VIII. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
A. Federal Jurisdiction Under Title VII and Notice of the Right to Sue
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)'
96. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (government's employment of
codefendant to elicit incriminating remarks from defendant in absence of counsel violates sixth
amendment); cf. United States v. Malik, 680 F.2d 1162, 1165 (7th Cir. 1982) (testimony of private
informant who obtains incriminating evidence from accused does not violate sixth amendment).
97. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71 (1980); see also supra notes 26-46 and
accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's analysis in Henry).
98. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text (discussing circumstances under which
informant in Thomas obtained incriminating evidence from defendant).
99. See supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text (discussing Thomas court's decision that
informant was not agent of government).
100. See supra notes 57-68 and accompanying text (comparing Fourth Circuit's decision in
Thomas with Supreme Court's decision in Henry); supra notes 69-92 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing other circuit court decisions bearing on agency of informants in sixth amendment right-to-
counsel cases).
101. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). But see Constitutional Limitations,
supra note 7, at 143 (Henry decision does not provide adequate guidance to lower courts faced
with sixth amendment cases involving informants).
102. See Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 133, 137 (4th Cir. 1983); see also supra notes 48-68 and
accompanying text (discussing Fourth Circuit's analysis in Thomas); supra notes 69-92 and
accompanying text (discussing holdings of other circuit courts that have addressed the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel after Henry).
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1964)), amended by Equal Employment Opportunity Act
of 1972, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e
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to eliminate discrimination by public or private employers' on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.' To gain the right to bring a civil
action under Title VII, an aggrieved party must first file a complaint with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 4 The EEOC is the
central administrative agency that enforces Title VII either by negotiating con-
ciliatory agreements between aggrieved parties and employers accused of
to 2000e-17 (1976 and Supp. V 1981)). Title VII is the designation for the Equal Employment
Opportunity segment of the Civil Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definition of employer). Title VII
imposes the same standards of compliance upon public and private employers. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977) (Congress intended equal treatment of public and private
employers); see also H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137 (Title VII applies equally to private and public employers). Title VII
defines public employers as persons engaged in any activity, business, or industry in commerce
or in which a labor dispute would hinder or obstruct commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976
& Supp. V 1981). Title VII defines private employers as any person engaged in an industry affect-
ing commerce that employs 15 or more people for 20 or more weeks in the current or preceeding
year. Id. § 2000e(b). Private employers, for the purposes of Title VII, do not include the United
States, corporations wholly owned by the United States, any departments and agencies of the
District of Columbia, Indian Tribes, or tax-exempt private membership clubs. Id.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Congress requires removal of barriers to employment that operate
discriminatorily). Employers can violate Title VII through discriminatory hiring practices or
discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
An employer engages in discriminatory hiring practices when the employer discharges or fails
or refuses to hire any individual because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. §
2000e-2(a)(1). Discriminatory employment practices occur when an employer acts in any way to
hinder an employee's opportunity for advancement because of the employee's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). An aggrieved party wishing to obtain
Title VII relief must file a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
within 180 days of an alleged discriminatory act. Id. § 2000e-5(e). In addition to the aggrieved
party, anyone acting on behalf of the aggrieved party or a member of the EEOC may file a
Title VII charge. Id. § 2000e-5(b). The EEOC must serve notice of the charge on the employer
within ten days of the filing date. Id. The EEOC will conduct an investigation to determine whether
reasonable cause exists to believe that the charge was true. Id. If the EEOC determines that no
reasonable cause exists, the EEOC will dismiss the action and notify the charging party and the
employer of the dismissal. Id. Upon notification of dismissal, the charging party may then bring
a Title VII action against the employer within 90 days in federal court. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). If,
however, the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that the charged employer engaged in
discriminatory practices, the EEOC will attempt to negotiate a settlement between the parties.
Id. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC is unable to negotiate a settlement, the EEOC will bring a civil
action against the charged employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). Although the EEOC, prior to 1972,
had no enforcement authority other than to refer cases to the Attorney General when private
negotiations failed, Congress, in 1972, granted the EEOC the power to eliminate discrimination
by bringing a civil action as well as by negotiating a settlement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(f)(c)
(1970), amended by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (EEOC enforcement mechanism).
Congress intended the 1972 amendments to allow the EEOC to enforce Title VII more effec-
tively. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2137, 2138 (1972 amendments give EEOC power to enforce Title VII more effective-
ly); see also Reiter, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and "Duplicitous Suits".
An Examination of EEOC v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 49 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1130, 1130-34
(1974) (pre-1972 EEOC enforcement mechanisms insufficient to enforce Title VII).
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discrimination or by bringing civil actions against accused employers. 5 If the
EEOC does not negotiate a settlement or file suit within 180 days of an
aggrieved party's original filing date, Title VII requires the EEOC to notify
the charging party of the inaction.6 The notification of inaction, or "right
to sue notice," gives the charging party the jurisdictional right to bring suit
in federal court against the named employer within ninety days after receipt
of the right to sue notice.7 The Fourth Circuit recently considered whether
the EEOC's refusal to issue a right to sue notice after an employer breached
a negotiated settlement would bar a Title VII complainant from suing the
employer in federal court under Title VII. 8 The Fourth Circuit, in Perdue v.
Roy Stone Transfer Corp.,9 held that actual issuance of a right to sue notice
was not a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction when the employer breached a
conciliation agreement.'"
In Perdue, the defendant Roy Stone Transfer Corporation (Stone) refused
to admit plaintiff Lexine Perdue to Stone's truck driving training program
because Stone felt that Perdue, as a female, would disrupt the training
program." Perdue filed a grievance with the EEOC, charging that Stone
violated Title VII by discriminating against Perdue on the basis of Perdue's
sex.'I The EEOC negotiated a settlement between Perdue and Stone that pro-
vided that Perdue would not bring suit under Title VII if Stone would give
fair consideration to Perdue's training-program application.' 3 After Roy Stone
had failed for three months to comply with the terms of the settlement agree-
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (EEOC enforcement mechanism); see
also supra note 4 (Title VII filing and enforcement procedures).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
7. Id. In considering Title VII's notice of inaction provision, the Supreme Court has stated
in dicta that the right to sue notice is a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction. See Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (prerequisite to federal jurisdiction met when charg-
ing party received right to sue notice); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798
(1973) (charging party satisfied jurisdictional prerequisite when party received right to sue notice);
see also infra note 25 (discussion of Alexander and McDonnell Douglas).
8. Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091, 1091 (4th Cir. 1982).
9. 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982).
10. Id. at 1095.
11. Id. at 1092. In Perdue, Roy Stone Transfer Corp. (Stone) admittedly denied Perdue
admission to a training program because Stone believed that Perdue, as a female, would create
marital tensions among the married, male drivers. Id. at 1092 n.1. Stone further asserted that
Perdue would have to be segregated during the training program. Id. Stone also stated that Stone
would not offer Perdue a position as a truck driver even if Perdue successfully completed the
training program. Id. When Perdue protested, a Stone representative replied, "[d]on't worry,
[we] can find another reason to reject you." Id.
12. Id. at 1092. In Perdue, the grievance Perdue filed with the EEOC alleged that Stone
violated Title VII by engaging in discriminatory hiring practices. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (discriminatory hiring practices occur when the employer fails or refuses
to hire an applicant because of applicant's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
13. 690 F.2d at 1092. As a part of the conciliation agreement that the EEOC negotiated
between Perdue and Stone, Stone promised to mail Perdue an application and to give the applica-
tion fair consideration. Id. In addition, Stone promised to notify Perdue and the EEOC of Per-
due's acceptance or rejection to the training program. Id.
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ment, Perdue asked the EEOC to issue Perdue a right to sue notice.' 4 When
the EEOC contacted Stone to learn the reason for Stone's failure to comply
with the negotiated settlement, Stone informed the EEOC that the training
program had been discontinued. 15 Perdue learned later that Stone had not
discontinued the training program and again requested the EEOC to issue a
right to sue notice.' 6 The EEOC informed Perdue by letter that the EEOC
interpreted Title VII as stating that the EEOC could not issue a right to sue
notice following a negotiated settlement.'I The EEOC, however, informed Per-
due that she did not need a right to sue notice to bring an action based upon
a breach of a negotiated settlement.' 8
Perdue subsequently brought suit in the United States District Court for
the Western District of Virginia, claiming that even though the EEOC did
not issue a right to sue notice, Title VII granted jurisdiction to federal courts
to hear Title VII claims when an employer breached a negotiated settlement.I9
The district court, however, dismissed Perdue's suit for lack of jurisdiction,
holding that issuance and receipt of a right to sue notice was a federal jurisdic-
tional prerequisite to a district court hearing a Title VII claim. 20 On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that Perdue
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. In Perdue, Perdue learned that Stone had not discontinued the training program
on the basis of evidence Perdue obtained in February, 1981. Id. Perdue's attorney then reported
to the EEOC that evidence indicated that Stone had not discontinued the training program. Id.
The EEOC, however, denied Perdue's subsequent request for a right to sue letter. Id.; see supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text (EEOC sent letter to Perdue stating the EEOC procedures
did not allow EEOC to issue right to sue letter following negotiated settlement).
17. 690 F.2d at 1092. In Perdue, the EEOC based its refusal to issue a right to sue notice
following a negotiated settlement on the EEOC's interpretation of § 2000e-5(f)(1) of Title VII.
Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Title VII gives claimant private right
to bring Title VII action in federal court). Section 2000e-5(f)(1) of Title VII enumerates the cir-
cumstances that must occur before the EEOC can issue a right to sue notice. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f)(I) (grievance filing procedures). Under § 2000e-5(f)(1), the EEOC must issue a right
to sue notice if the EEOC has not negotiated a settlement between the parties or brought an
action against the employer. Id. In Perdue, the EEOC interpreted § 2000e-5(f)(1) as allowing
the EEOC to issue a right to sue notice only when the EEOC has not negotiated a settlement
or brought suit in federal court. 690 F.2d at 1095. But see infra notes 26-27 and accompanying
text (Fourth Circuit held that EEOC interpretation of § 2000e-5(f)(1) incorrect).
18. 690 F.2d at 1092. In Perdue, EEOC sent a letter to Perdue on March 10, 1981 stating
that the EEOC's procedures would not allow the EEOC to issue a right to sue letter following
a negotiated settlement. Id.
19. Id. Perdue brought suit on June 4, 1981, within 90 days of receipt of the EEOC letter
informing Perdue that the EEOC could not issue a right to sue notice following a negotiated
settlement. Id.; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (EEOC letter to Perdue). In Perdue's
complaint against Stone, Perdue alleged that she had exhausted all available administrative remedies.
690 F.2d at 1092.
20. 690 F.2d at 1091. In Perdue, the district court dismissed Perdue's suit for lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction. See Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 528 F. Supp. 177, 178 (W.D.
Va. 1981), rev'd, 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982); see also FED. R. Civ. PRO. 12(h)(3) (court will
dismiss case on pleading if lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
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need only prove entitlement to a right to sue notice to satisfy Title VII's federal
jurisdictional requirements. 2
In determining whether Title VII required actual issuance of a right to
sue notice for federal jurisdiction under Title VII, the Perdue court recognized
that section 2000e of Title VII expressly created a private right of action for
parties charging employers with employment discrimination. 22 The court noted
that section 2000e required the EEOC to issue a right to sue notice to an ag-
grieved party if the EEOC had taken no action within 180 days after the ag-
grieved party filed the original charge.23 The Perdue court stated that the
EEOC's issuance of the right to sue notice allowed the charging party to bring
a Title VII action within ninety days against the employer in federal court.
2
1
The Fourth Circuit, however, noted that although the Supreme Court had
characterized the right to sue notice as a federal jurisdictional prerequisite
to Title VII actions, the Supreme Court specifically had not held that a plain-
tiff's failure to receive a right to sue notice would bar the plaintiff from federal
court.25
21. 690 F.2d at 1095.
22. Id. at 1093; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (scope of private
right of action); see also supra note 4 (discussion of procedure for enforcing Title VII).
23. 690 F.2d at 1093; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (EEOC must
issue right to sue notice 180 days after charge filed if no suit brought).
24. 690 F.2d at 1093; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Title VII claim-
ant must bring suit within 90 days of receipt of right to sue notice). See infra notes 38-41 and
accompanying text (discussion of 90 day limit's purpose).
25. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (jurisdictional prere-
quisites met when petitioner received statutory notice of right to sue); McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798 (1973) (respondent satisfied jurisdictional prerequisites upon receipt
of right to sue notice). The Fourth Circuit in Perdue distinguished Alexander and McDonnell
as not dealing specifically with Title VII's statutory notice requirement. 690 F.2d at 1093; see
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 (petitioner met Title VII jurisdictional prerequisite by filing timely
charge and acting on right to sue notice); McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 798 (timely charge and receipt
of right to sue notice satisfied Title VII jurisdictional prerequisites). In Alexander, the petitioner
Alexander filed a grievance pursuant to Alexander's union's collective bargaining agreement with
the defendant Gardner-Denver Company after Gardner-Denver discharged the petitioner. 415
U.S. at 39. Petitioner Alexander, a black man, alleged only that Gardner-Denver had discharged
him unjustly and not that racial discrimination prompted the discharge. Id. During an arbitration
hearing concerning Alexander's discharge, the arbitrator concluded that Gardner-Denver had
discharged Alexander for just cause. Id. at 42. Prior to the arbitration hearing, however, Alex-
ander had filed a racial discrimination charge against Gardner-Denver with the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission which referred the complaint to the EEOC. Id. like the arbitrator, the EEOC
concluded that no probable cause existed that Gardner-Denver had discharged Alexander in violation
of Title VII. Id. at 43. The EEOC then notified Alexander of his right to file suit in the District
Court for the District of Colorado. Id. The district court granted Gardner-Denver's motion for
summary judgment. Id. The district court found that Alexander had voluntarily submitted the
grievance to the collective bargaining agreement arbitrator and the court of appeals affirmed.
Id. The court therefore held that the arbitrator's holding that Gardner-Denver had just cause
to discharge Alexander was binding upon Alexander. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to consider whether the petitioner waived his Title VII rights by submitting to the col-
lective bargaining arbitration. Id. In deciding Alexander, the Supreme Court first noted that Alex-
ander had satisfied Title VII's jurisdictional requirements by filing the charge with the EEOC
19841
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To determine whether Title VII restricted federal jurisdiction to only those
cases in which the EEOC had issued a right to sue notice, the Perdue court
first examined the language of Title VII's notice section.2 6 The court rejected
the EEOC's conclusion that the plain language of Title VII's notice section
specified the only circumstances in which the EEOC could issue a right to
sue notice.27 The court instead determined that the language of Title VII's
notice section established when Title VII entitled a charging party to a right
to sue notice.28 Noting that an EEOC's wrongful failure to issue a right to
sue notice does not bar a plaintiff from federal court under Title VII, the
Fourth Circuit concluded that the plain language of Title VII's notice section
required a charging party only to prove entitlement to a right to sue notice
to maintain federal jurisdiction under Title VII.29 Furthermore, the court re-
jected the district court's interpretation that section 2000e-5 required a right
to sue notice as a prerequisite to federal jurisdiction because the district court's
interpretation would bar permanently from federal court a Title VII claimant
who entered into negotiations with an employer who never intended to honor
and receiving the right to sue notice. Id. at 47; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (Title VII jurisdictional preconditions). The Court stated only in dicta that Title VII
requires a Title VII claimant to produce a right to sue notice to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional
prerequisites. 415 U.S. at 47.
In McDonnell, the petitioner Green filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that McDonnell
Douglas engaged in discriminatory hiring practices. 411 U.S. at 796. The EEOC, however, did
not determine whether reasonable caused existed to believe that McDonnell Douglas violated Ti-
tle VII through discriminatory hiring activity. Id. at 797. The Court first stated that Green's
timely charge to the EEOC and receipt of the right to sue notice satisfied Title VII's jurisdictional
requirements. Id. at 798. Noting that Congress enacted Title VII to eliminate discrimination,
the Court held that the EEOC's finding of no reasonable cause did not bar Green from pursuing
a private Title VII claim. Id. at 807. Like Alexander, therefore, the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas stated in dicta that Title VII requires a right to sue notice to satisfy Title VII's jurisdic-
tional prerequisites. Id. at 798; see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47 (jurisdictional prerequisites met
when Alexander received statutory notice of right to sue).
26. See 690 F.2d at 1093 (§ 2000e-5(f)(1) authorizes private right to action); 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(f)(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Title VII claimant may bring suit within 90 days of receipt
of right to sue notice).
27. 690 F.2d at 1093; see supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussion of EEOC letter
to Perdue interpreting EEOC's procedures under Title VII).
28. 690 F.2d at 1093.
29. Id. The Perdue court relied on Russell v. American Tobacco Co. in holding that the
EEOC's wrongful failure to issue a right to sue notice would not bar a Title VII claimant from
federal court. Id.; see Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357, 365 (4th Cir. 1975) (EEOC
administrative mistakes do not bar Title VII claimant from federal court), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
935 (1976). In Russell, the plaintiffs, black employees, brought a Title VII class action against
defendant American Tobacco Company and Tobacco Workers International Union (Union) for
engaging in discriminatory employment practices by systematically excluding the plaintiffs from
promotions within the defendant company. 528 F.2d at 361; see supra note 3 (definition of
discriminatory employment practices). Although the plaintiffs named both American Tobacco
Company and Union in the original charge to the EEOC, the EEOC failed to notify Union of
the charge and did not attempt to negotiate a settlement before issuing the plaintiffs' right to
sue notice. 528 F.2d at 365. The Fourth Circuit rejected the Union's contention that the EEOC's
failure to notify the union of the charge deprived the lower court of jurisdiction, stating that
a Title VII claimant is not held responsible for EEOC procedural failures. Id.
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a negotiated settlement." The Fourth Circuit, therefore, held that the Perdue
court would adopt the district court's interpretation of Title VII's notice sec-
tion only if the three underlying policies of the right to sue notice supported
the interpretation that Title VII required a right to sue notice to satisfy Title
VII's jurisdictional prerequisites. 3'
The Fourth Circuit noted as the first underlying policy of Title VII that
Congress intended the right to sue notice to promote private dispute resolu-
tion by requiring a Title VII complainant to attempt a private settlement
through the EEOC's negotiating procedures before attempting to bring a Title
VII action in federal court.32 The court further noted that allowing a Title
VII complainant to bring an action in federal court when an employer had
performed or tendered part of a previous conciliation agreement would hinder
EEOC attempts to privately negotiate settlements.33 The Perdue court, however,
concluded that allowing plaintiffs access to federal courts after an employer
allegedly had breached a settlement agreement would not hinder private dispute
resolution but rather would discourage employers from negotiating in bad
faith.
3 4
The Fourth Circuit next noted that Congress required the EEOC to issue
a right to sue notice before a Title VII claimant could file a claim in federal
court to indicate that the EEOC's attempt to settle privately the Title VII dispute
had ended and thereby avoid concurrent judicial and administrative
proceedings. 3 The court, however, determined that the policy against concur-
30. 690 F.2d at 1093; see infra note 89 (district court's interpretation of Title VII's notice
requirements promotes bad faith employer negotiations).
31. 690 F.2d at 1093.
32. Id.; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974) (voluntary com-
pliance preferred means for settling Title VII disputes); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2146-47 (administrative agen-
cies superior to federal courts for rapid and informal resolution of Title VII grievances). In draft-
ing Title VII, Congress intended to promote private dispute resolution for several reasons. See
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 2137, 2146-7. First, Congress concluded that administrative tribunals are better equipped
to sort out complexities involving employment discrimination. Id. (issues in employment discrimina-
tion cases often perplexed courts). Next, Congress stated that private dispute resolution would
prevent increased judicial expenditures because courts would thereby avoid dealing with the com-
plexities of employment discrimination cases. Id. Finally, agencies do not have the same formal
rules of procedure as the courts and, therefore, the agencies are not vulnerable to dilatory tactics. Id.
33. 690 F.2d at 1094; see Trujillo v. Colorado, 649 F.2d 823, 826 (10th Cir. 1981) (employer's
tender of settlement agreement bars claimant from federal court). In Trujillo, Trujillo entered
into and enjoyed the benefits of an agreement which the EEOC negotiated between Trujillo and
Colorado. Id. at 824-25. After the Colorado public agency had tendered partial performance
of the agreement, Trujillo attempted to bring a Title VII action to gain a more beneficial settle-
ment. Id. The Tenth Circuit held that Trujillo could not bring a Title VII action in federal court
because Colorado had tendered partial performance of the settlement. Id. The Trujillo court
concluded that to allow Trujillo to bring the claim would discourage charged employers from
privately negotiating settlements of Title VII claims because the employers potential liability under
Title VII would not be resolved by a negotiated settlement. Id.
34. 690 F.2d at 1094.
35. Id.; see H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
1984]
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rent proceedings was inapplicable when the EEOC closed a case and refused
to reopen it even when the employer breached a negotiated settlement. 3' The
Perdue court noted that the policy against concurrent proceedings was inap-
plicable because once the EEOC declared that the EEOC's role in the matter
was ended, allowing a claimant access to federal courts would not compromise
either the EEOC's or the employer's interest in the administrative process.
37
The Perdue court next stated that after the EEOC declared that the EEOC's
role in the matter was ended, the EEOC would issue a right to sue notice
and thereby satisfy the third underlying policy of Title VII's right to sue notice
requirement by marking the beginning of the ninety day period within which
a Title VII claimant must bring suit. 3' The court found that the purpose of
the ninety day limitation was the protection of employers from prejudice as
a result of an employee bringing a Title VII action after apparently acquiesc-
ing to the employer's discriminatory practices. 39 The Perdue court, however,
noted that to allow Perdue to bring suit would not violate the policy of pro-
tecting employers from "stale claims" because Perdue brought suit in the
district court within ninety days after receiving the EEOC's letter informing
Perdue that the EEOC could not issue a right to sue notice following a
negotiated settlement. 0 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the policies underly-
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2148 (EEOC and courts should avoid duplicative proceedings). When
drafting Title VII, the House Committee on Education and Labor was concerned about the potential
conflict between a Title VII complainant's existing private right of action in state forums and
the new civil enforcement powers of the EEOC. Id. Concluding that duplicative proceedings should
be avoided, the Committee determined that EEOC jurisdiction should be terminated when a Title
VII complainant pursued a private claim in a state forum. Id. Similarly, if the Title VII complain-
ant agreed, the private action should be terminated when the EEOC achieved a negotiated settle-
ment. Id. One commentator, however, has concluded that the ban against duplicitous proceedings
effectively eliminates the EEOC's enforcement powers. See Reiter, supra note 4, at 1133-34. Reiter
states that the high number of unresolved claims will nullify effectively the EEOC's powers. Id.
at 1133. Reiter notes that the high number of claims will mean that the EEOC will almost never
bring a civil action or negotiate a settlement within the 180 day period and therefore individuals
will bring private actions when the EEOC has not negotiated a settlement within the 180 day
time limit. Id. at 1134.
36. 690 F.2d at 1093.
37. Id. In concluding that Perdue would not disrupt the administrative process by bringing
the Title VII claim, the Perdue court rejected Stone's argument that the court require Perdue
to sue the EEOC to obtain the right to sue notice. Id. at 1094 n.6. The Perdue court noted
that requiring Perdue to join the federal proceedings would be unjust for two reasons. Id. First,
joining the EEOC would only complicate and increase the federal Title VII action. Id. Because
of the increased complexity, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the longer proceeding could pre-
vent the complainant's bringing the Title VII action. Id.
38. Id. at 1094.
39. Id.; see Johnson v. Railway Expressway Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)
(ninety day time limitation protects employers from employees who bring late claims of
discriminatory employment practices).
40. 690 F.2d at 1094. In remanding Perdue's Title VII claim to allow Perdue to prove
that Stone breached the conciliation agreement, the Fourth Circuit required the district court
to determine when Perdue became entitled to the right to sue notice. Id. at 1094 n.7. The Fourth
Circuit required the district court to determine when the EEOC declared that its role in the matter
was ended so the district court could determine whether Perdue brought the Title VII action
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ing the right to sue notice requirement supported the conclusion that Title
VII entitles a claimant to a right to sue notice if the complainant can prove
that the employer neither performed nor tendered performance of a settle-
ment agreement."' As a consequence, the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded
the case to allow Perdue to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of Title VII
by proving that Stone breached the conciliation agreement.
42
Although the Perdue dissent agreed with the Perdue majority's statement
that Perdue was not foreclosed from federal court because of the settlement,
the dissent did not agree with the majority's holding that Perdue need only
show entitlement to a right to sue notice to maintain federal jurisdiction under
Title VII. 43 The dissent classified issuance and receipt of a right to sue notice
as a jurisdictional prerequisite to a Title VII suit because the Supreme Court
had stated in dicta that a right to sue notice was a Title VII jurisdictional
prerequisite."" Characterizing the conciliation agreement as an executory ac-
cord, the dissent would have permitted Perdue to maintain federal jurisdic-
tion once Perdue demonstrated a breach of the settlement agreement. 5 The
dissent, however, also would have required joinder of the EEOC to allow the
lower court to order the EEOC to issue a right to sue notice if Perdue should
prove a breach of the settlement agreement. 46 Accordingly, the dissent would
have affirmed the district court's dismissal of Perdue's claim for lack of
jurisdiction but only because Perdue did not join the EEOC as an indispensi-
ble party to the litigation.4 7
within 90 days after becoming entitled to a right to sue notice. Id. The Perdue court stated that
Title VII entitled Perdue to a right to sue notice when the EEOC notified Perdue that the EEOC
would take no further action on Perdue's behalf. Id.
41. Id. at 1095.
42. Id.
43. Id. (Widener, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1097; see supra note 25 (discussion of Supreme Court cases suggesting that right
to sue notice is jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII cases).
45. 690 F.2d at 1096. In classifying the conciliation agreement as an executory accord, the
Perdue dissent adopted the argument that Perdue advanced in the briefs. Id.; see Brief for Ap-
pellant at 19-20, Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellant]. Although the dissent and Perdue characterized the conciliation agree-
ment in different terms, both concluded that proof of a breach would nullify the conciliation
agreement and revive the underlying Title VII claim. 690 F.2d at 1096; Brief for Appellant at
20; see Eichelberger v. Mann, 115 Va. 774, 778, 80 S.E. 595, 596 (1914) (accord without satisfac-
tion is nullity); 6 A. CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1268-69 (1962) (breach of accord revives
underlying action).
46. 690 F.2d at 1096-97.
47. Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (indispensible party rule). An indispensible party is a non-
party to a litigation whose joinder a court determines to be necessary either to protect the non-
party's interests or to provide complete relief among the parties to the litigation. FED. R. Civ.
P. 19(a). If the non-party's joinder is impossible, the court will dismiss the case if the non-party
is indispensible. Id. 19(b). Among the factors that a court considers when determining whether
to dismiss litigation are the extent of prejudice to the parties and non-parties, the possibility
of shaping the judgment to mitigate the prejudice, the adequacy of a remedy that the court can
grant in the non-party's absence, and the adequacy of a remedy that a party plaintiff will have
if the court dismisses the litigation. Id.
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Although the Supreme Court has suggested in dicta that issuance and
receipt of a right to sue notice is a Title VII jurisdictional prerequisite, the
Supreme Court has not specifically considered the jurisdictional significance
of the right to sue notice.4 1 Past Supreme Court holdings in Title VII actions,
however, support the reasoning and effect of the Perdue court's holding that
a plaintiff need only show entitlement to a right to sue notice to satisfy Title
VII's jurisdictional requirements.4 9 The Supreme Court consistently has held
that courts should not interpret Title VII technically but instead should inter-
pret Title VII broadly to allow lower courts the ability to grant Title VII plain-
tiffs as much relief as possible." In Perdue, the Fourth Circuit rejected as
too technical the district court's interpretation of Title VII that the right to
sue notice was a Title VII jurisdictional prerequisite." The Perdue court's
reasoning, therefore, is consistent with Supreme Court Title VII cases because
the Perdue court gave greater consideration to the substantive policies of Title
VII than to a possible technical reading of the statute.52
In addition to holding that courts should interpret Title VII broadly, the
Supreme Court has stated that Title VII grants federal courts plenary powers
to ensure the elimination of discrimination." The Perdue court ensured the
48. 678 F.2d at 1192; see supra note 25 and accompanying text (Supreme Court cases sug-
gesting that right to sue notice is jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII cases).
49. 678 F.2d at 1193; see infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (Supreme Court language
supports reasoning and effect of Perdue).
50. See Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972). In Love, the Supreme Court held that
courts should construe Title VII broadly. Id. at 525. In deciding Love, the Court first noted
that lay persons rather than legal practitioners enacted Title VII. Id. at 527. The Court, therefore,
concluded that lawyers who would strictly construe Title VII would place form over content.
Id. The Court held that courts should resolve Title VII procedural disputes by examining the
intent, rather than the language, of Title VII. Id. at 525. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed
the principle that courts should construe Title VII broadly in several recent cases. See, e.g. Zipes
v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 397 (1982) (courts should not read Title VII technically);
General Tel. Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., 446 U.S. 318, 332 (1980) (Title
VII gives courts wide discretion to fashion complete relief) (quoting 118 CONG. Rac. 7168 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Williams)); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975) (Con-
gress intended courts to provide "make whole" relief).
51. See 690 F.2d at 1093 (court will adopt district court's strict reading only if underlying
policies so require).
52. See id. at 1093 (court bases interpretation of Title VII on underlying policies); see also
supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text (Supreme Court language supports Perdue court's
reasoning).
53. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45 (1974). In determining that Title
VII grants federal courts plenary enforcement powers, the Supreme Court in Alexander first noted
that Title VII authorizes courts to issue injunctive relief or such relief as is necessary to eliminate
unlawful employment practices. Id. at 44; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), (g) (1976 & Supp. V. 1981)
(provision discussing injunctive relief). The Court also noted that Title VII does not condition
a court's powers upon an EEOC finding of reasonable cause to believe that an employer violated
Title VII. 415 U.S. at 44-45. The Court, therefore, concluded that Title VII grants plenary powers
to courts to enforce Title VII. Id.; see McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-99
(1972) (federal jurisdiction not contingent upon EEOC finding of reasonable cause); see also
General Tel. Co. of the Northwest v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 446 U.S. 318,
332 (1980) (Title VII gives courts plenary powers to eliminate discrimination); c.f. Johnson v.
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elimination of discrimination because the effect of the court's holding that
Perdue need only prove that Stone breached the negotiated settlement to main-
tain federal Title VII jurisdiction is to ensure that employers will not attempt
to circumvent Title VII by entering into settlement negotiations with no inten-
tion of honoring a negotiated settlement.14 The Fourth Circuit in Perdue,
therefore, properly exercised the plenary power that the Supreme Court had
granted federal courts to eliminate employment discrimination." As a result,
although past Supreme Court cases stated in dicta that the right to sue notice
was a jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII actions, past Supreme Court deci-
sions lend considerable support to the reasoning and to the effect of the Fourth
Circuit's holding in Perdue that a Title VII claimant need only prove entitle-
ment to a right to sue notice to maintain Title VII jurisdiction.
5 6
Like the Supreme Court, a majority of federal circuit courts have sug-
gested that issuance and receipt of a right to sue notice is a Title VII jurisdic-
tional prerequisite, but have not specifically evaluated the jurisdictional
significance of the right to sue notice.- 7 A minority of courts, however, have
considered specifically whether the right to sue notice is a prerequisite to Title
VII federal jurisdiction. 8 For example, in Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 457-58 (1975) (Title VII enacted to eliminate
discrimination).
54. See supra text accompanying notes 32-34 (Perdue holding allowing Title VII claimants
access to federal courts upon proof of employer's breach of negotiated settlement prevents
employer's bad faith negotiations).
55. Id.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51, 53-54 (Perdue court followed reasoning of
past Supreme Court Title VII cases by broadly interpreting Title VII to ensure elimination of
discriminatory employment and hiring practices).
57. See Gonzalez-Allez Balseyro v. GTE-Lenkurt Inc., 702 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1983)
(court stated that right to sue notice was jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII while examining
whether 90 day limit subject to waiver); Gordon v. National Youth Work Alliance, 675 F.2d
356, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (court stated in dicta that right to sue notice was Title VII federal
jurisdictional prerequisite while considering whether 180 day limit subject to waiver); Sheehan
v. Purolator Courier Corp., 676 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1981) (court stated that right to sue notice
necessary to establish federal Title VII jurisdiction while considering whether temporary injunc-
tive relief available under Title VII); Movement for Opportunity, Etc. v. General Motors, 622
F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1980) (court specified right to sue notice as Title VII federal jurisdic-
tional prerequisite while considering whether 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) supplies
Title VII jurisdiction); Omawale v. WBZ, 610 F.2d 20, 22 n.4 (1st Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (court
stated that right to sue notice was federal Title VII jurisdictional prerequisite while considering
whether plaintiff established prima facie case of discrimination); Shea v. City of St. Paul, 601
F.2d 345, 347-48 (8th Cir. 1979) (court stated that right to sue notice was prerequisite to Title
VII federal jurisdiction while considering whether plaintiff filed suit within 90 days of receipt
of right to sue notice); Hicks v. ABT Assoc., 572 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1978) (court classified
right to sue notice as Title VII federal jurisdictional prerequisite while determining whether plain-
tiff established valid claim of employment discrimination); Mahroom v. Hook, 563 F.2d 1369,
1373 (9th Cir. 1977) (court held obtaining right to sue notice was Title VII jurisdictional prere-
quisite while considering whether right to sue notice retroactive), cert. denied. 436 U.S. 904 (1978).
58. See Pinkard v. Pullman Standard, 678 F.2d 1211, 1215 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (right
to sue notice requirement subject to waiver), reh'g denied, 685 F.2d 1383 (1982), cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 729 (1983); Jackson v. Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1000 (11th Cir.
1982) (right to sue notice is condition precedent to Title VII claim).
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Ry. Co., 5 9 the Eleventh Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs' failure to
receive a right to sue notice barred the plaintiffs' Title VII claim from federal
court." In Jackson, the plaintiffs failed to include the name of one of the
defendants, the Brotherhood Railway Carmen of America and Canada
(Brotherhood), in the original EEOC complaint. 6' As a consequence of the
plaintiffs' omission, the right to sue notice that the EEOC issued to the plain-
tiffs did not name the Brotherhood as a charged party.62 The Brotherhood,
however, failed to assert that the plaintiffs' right to sue notices did not name
the Brotherhood as a respondent to the plaintiffs' Title VII action.63 At trial,
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia entered
judgment against the Brotherhood. 6 The Brotherhood appealed the district
court's judgment to the Eleventh Circuit, alleging that the plaintiffs' Title VII
claim failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs' right
to sue notice did not name the Brotherhood as a respondent.
65
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit first noted that past Supreme Court deci-
sions classified several of Title VII's jurisdictional preconditions as conditions
precedent and not jurisdictional prerequisites. 66 The Jackson court stated that
59. 678 F.2d 992 (11th Cir. 1982).
60. Id. at 1000.
61. Id. at 998-99.
62. Id. at 1000.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 999.
65. Id. at 1000. In addition to alleging that plaintiffs did not obtain a right to sue notice
that named the Brotherhood as a respondent, the Brotherhood in Jackson also alleged that plain-
tiffs failed to file the initial charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, in Jackson, dismissed the Brotherhood's claim that the district
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs failed to file charges within 180
days after the alleged discriminatory act. Id. at 1006. In dismissing the claim, the Jackson court
relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Zipes v. Trans World Airlines. Id.; see Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982). In Zipes, the Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Associa-
tion (Stewardesses) brought a class action against Trans World Airlines (TWA) for engaging in
discriminatory employment practices. Id. at 388; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976 & Supp.
V 1981) (discriminatory employment practices occur when employer segregates employees on basis
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in way that adversely affects employee status).
In Zipes, the Stewardesses alleged that TWA violated Title VII by its policy of grounding all
female flight attendants who became pregnant while allowing male flight attendants who became
fathers to remain aloft. 455 U.S. at 388. TWA, however, claimed that the Stewardess' claim
failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the Stewardesses failed to file charges with
the EEOC within 180 days after the discriminatory employment practices occurred. Id. at 389.
The Supreme Court examined the legislative history and concluded that Congress had not in-
tended the 180 day time limit to be more than a condition precedent similar to a statute of limita-
tions. Id. at 394; see 110 CoNG. Rnc. 12723 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (Senator Hum-
phrey characterized 180 day limit as period of limitations). The Zipes Court therefore held that
Title VII did not bar the stewardess' claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the
180 day time limit was a condition precedent subject to waiver. 455 U.S. at 398.
66. 678 F.2d 1004-07; see Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982) (90
day time limit within which claimant must bring suit is condition precedent and therefore subject
to waiver); Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 254 (1980) (Supreme Court characterized
180 day limit as limitations period); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 811 n.9 (1980) (respon-
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the result of the Supreme Court's classification of many Title VII jurisdic-
tional preconditions as conditions precedent was that all jurisdictional precon-
ditions of Title VII were subject to equitable waiver.67 Concluding that Title
VII's requirement of a right to sue notice was a jurisdictional precondition,
the Jackson court held that issuance of a right to sue notice was a condition
precedent to Title VII jurisdiction and therefore subject to equitable waiver.68
The Jackson court, however, still required a plaintiff to allege in the pleadings
that the EEOC issued the plaintiff a right to sue notice to maintain federal
jurisdiction under TItle VII.6 9 The court noted that the plaintiffs had not alleged
that the EEOC issued the plaintiffs a right to sue notice that named the
Brotherhood as a respondent.7" The court, however, further noted that the
Brotherhood did not challenge the plaintiffs' failure until after the district
court entered judgment against the Brotherhood.7" The Eleventh Circuit,
therefore, held that the Brotherhood waived the right to challenge the plain-
tiffs' failure to allege that the EEOC issued the plaintiffs a right to sue notice
naming the Brotherhood as a respondent because the right to sue notice was
a condition precedent and not a jurisdictional prerequisite.72 In contrast 'to
the Jackson court's holding that the right to sue notice was a 6ondition prece-
dent and therefore subject to equitable waiver, the Fourth Circuit in Perdue
held that the right to sue notice was a jurisdictional prerequisite to Title VII
jurisdiction but that a plaintiff need only prove entitlement to a right to sue
notice to maintain federal jurisdiction under Title VII.13 As a result, the
minority of circuits that have specifically considered the jurisdictional
significance of the right to sue notice do not support the Fourth Circuit's
holding in Perdue.
7 4
In addition to a minority of other circuits, the Fourth Circuit also has
specifically examined the jurisdictional significance of the right to sue notice. 7
dent waived right to challenge whether claimant brought suit within 90 days because time limit
was condition precedent); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975) (Title
VII class relief available to class members who did not exhaust administrative remedies because
exhaustion condition precedent); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 799 (1973)
(EEOC finding of reasonable cause only condition precedent to federal Title VII action).
67. 678 F.2d at 1009-10.





73. 690 F.2d at 1093.
74. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (minority of courts that have considered
specifically the jurisdictional significance of the right to sue notice classify the right to sue notice
as condition precedent and not jurisdictional).
75. See Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 678 F.2d 1190, 1192 (4th Cir. 1982) (right
to sue notice prerequisite to private Title VII action), rev'd on other grounds, 697 F.2d 582,
584 (4th Cir. 1983); United Black Firefighters of Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir.
1979) (right to sue notice determines whether claimant can bring suit in federal court). In Hirst,
the plaintiffs consisted of two groups. Id. at 845. The first group were unsuccessful applicants
for employment with the Norfolk fire department who charged that officials of the city of Nor-
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The Perdue court's holding that a Title VII plaintiff need only prove entitle-
ment to a right to sue notice to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional requirements,
however, is inconsistent with past Fourth Circuit decisions.7 6 The Fourth Cir-
cuit had held consistently in past cases that issuance of a right to sue notice
was a jurisdictional prerequisite in Title VII actions." For example, in Adams
v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 71 the Fourth Circuit examined whether Title
VII permitted the EEOC to issue individual right to sue notices to Title VII
complainants not joining a class action that the EEOC brought against the
defendant Proctor & Gamble on the complainants' behalf." Although the
EEOC subsequently entered into a negotiated settlement with Proctor & Gam-
ble, the EEOC issued right to sue notices to the complainants not joining in
the settlement.80 When the plaintiffs brought a Title VII action against Pro-
ctor & Gamble in federal court, the district court dismissed the suit for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction."1 The district court reasoned that the EEOC's
settlement with the defendant precluded the EEOC from issuing right to sue
notices on the same underlying claim.8 2 The plaintiffs' Title VII claim,
folk violated Title VII by engaging in discriminatory hiring practices. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(a)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definition of discriminatory hiring practices). The second
group consisted of members of the Norfolk fire department who alleged that officials of the
city of Norfolk violated Title VII by engaging in discriminatory employment practices. 604 F.2d
at 847; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (definition of discriminatory employ-
ment practices). In Hirst, the plaintiff applicants failed to file charges of discrimination with
the EEOC and as a result never received right to sue notices. 604 F.2d at 847. The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's Title VII claim because the failure to
obtain a right to sue notice deprived the Title VII claim of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
76. 690 F.2d at 1093.
77. See Adams v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 678 F.2d 1190, 1192 (4th Cir. 1982) (Title
VII claim explicitly conditioned on receipt of right to sue notice); United Black Firefighters of
Norfolk v. Hirst, 604 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1979) (failure to obtain right to sue notice deprived
applicants' Title VII claim of subject matter jurisdiction); see also supra note 75 (discussion of Hirst).
78. 678 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 697 F.2d 582, 584 (4th Cir. 1983).
79. 678 F.2d at 1191. In Adams, the EEOC brought a class action against Proctor & Gam-
ble on behalf of two dozen employees who filed charges with the EEOC. Id. The EEOC brought
the suit because the EEOC could not negotiate a settlement with Proctor & Gamble. Id.; see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (EEOC may bring civil action if EEOC can
not negotiate settlement with charged employer). During the three year discovery period, none
of the employees on whose behalf the EEOC brought the suit chose to intervene although Title
VII granted the employees the right to intervene. 678 F.2d at 1191; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1976 & Supp. V 1981) (aggrieved parties have right to intervene in EEOC action).
80. 678 F.2d at 1191. In Adams, the civil action that the EEOC brought against Proctor
& Gamble never reached the trial stage because the EEOC and Proctor & Gamble reached a
consent decree. Id. The EEOC and Proctor & Gamble, however, disagreed over the effect of
the consent decree on potential private Title VII claims against Proctor & Gamble. Id. at 1191-92.
The EEOC argued that the private rights of action were not foreclosed because the employees
were only potential witnesses in the EEOC action. Id. at 1192. Proctor & Gamble argued that
the settlement affected the entire class and therefore precluded any class members from bringing
subsequent private Title VII claims. Id. The EEOC subsequently issued individual right to sue





therefore, failed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the district
court classified the right to sue notice as a prerequisite to Title VII federal
jurisdiction.8 3 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held without discussion that the
right to sue notice was a Title VII jurisdictional prerequisite.8 4 The Adams
court, however, further held that the complainants could bring a Title VII
claim in federal court because the EEOC properly issued the right to sue
notice.8 " In Perdue, therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed Fourth Circuit prece-
dent by holding that a plaintiff need only show entitlement to a right to sue
notice to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional requirements.,
The Fourth Circuit correctly rejected Fourth Circuit precedent and the
district court's holding that the EEOC must issue a right to sue notice before
a plaintiff may bring a Title VII action in federal court.17 The strict require-
ment that a party must always receive a right to sue notice to maintain Title
VII federal jurisdiction is contrary to Title VII's overriding purpose of
eliminating discrimination.88 Requiring without exception a right to sue notice
prevents the elimination of discrimination because the EEOC will not issue
a right to sue notice after the EEOC negotiated a settlement, even when an
employer breaches the settlement.8 9 The Perdue court, however, held that proof
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1193. In determining that the EEOC could properly issue the right to sue notices,
the Fourth Circuit in Adams concluded that the legislative history of Title VII indicated that
the EEOC action did not preclude the later private claims. Id.; see 118 CoNG. R c. 1068 (1972)
(statement of Sen. Javits) (discussing need to preserve private right of action). The Adams court
enumerated two aspects of Title VII's legislative and judicial history that compelled the conclu-
sion. Id. The Adams court first noted that, in addition to the situation in which the EEOC has
not negotiated a settlement or filed suit, the Joint Conference analysis of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 indicated that a Title VII claimant was also entitled to a right to sue
notice if the EEOC resolution was unsatisfactory to the charging party. Id. at 1194; see Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Title VII, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981) (1972 amendments to Civil Rights
Act of 1964); 118 CONG. REC. 1068 (1972) (statement of Sen. Javits) (charging party entitled
to right to sue notice if unsatisfied with EEOC resolution); see also supra note 1 (discussion
of Title VII and Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972). The Adams next court noted
that the Supreme Court has also stated that § 2000e-5(f)(1) of Title VII allows a Title VII clai-
mant to bring a Title VII claim if the claimant is unsatisfied with the EEOC resolution of the
claim. 678 F.2d at 1193-94; see General Telephone Co. of the Northwest v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (plaintiff may bring Title VII claim if unsatisfied
with EEOC settlement).
86. 690 F.2d at 1093.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 53-55 (Perdue holding ensures greatest relief to Title
VII claimants).
88. See infra note 89 (strict interpretation of Title VII's notice requirements prevents effec-
tive enforcement of Title VII).
89. 690 F.2d at 1093; see Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 528 F. Supp. 177, 179
(W.D. Va. 1981) (Title VII claimant who enters into settlement agreement forfeits private Title
VII right of action), rev'd, 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1982). The strict interpretation that both
past Fourth Circuit courts and the district court in Perdue made of Title VII's notice requirement
would bar permanently a party that enters into a conciliation agreement from federal court, even
if the employer never honored the settlement. See Perdue, 690 F.2d 1091, 1093 (4th Cir. 1982)
19841
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
of the employer's breach of the agreement was sufficient to satisfy Title VII's
jurisdictional requirements. 90 As a consequence, the Perdue court's holding
promotes the elimination of discrimination by employers who would seek to
circumvent Title VII by entering into negotiated settlements the employers in-
tend to breach.91 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit, in rejecting the strict re-
quirement of a right to sue notice, correctly gave greater consideration to the
substantive policies of Title VII rather than to a possible technical reading
of the language of Title VII's notice requirement.
92
The Fourth Circuit in Perdue also correctly held that the substantive policies
underlying Title VII's notice requirement supported a broad interpretation of
Title VII's enforcement procedures by allowing a plaintiff to bring suit in
federal court upon proof of a breach of a conciliation agreement. 93 Courts
have described Title VII's enforcement mechanisms as being the result of a
balance struck between Congress' desire for private dispute resolution and
the desire for effective compliance with Title VII.94 The Fourth Circuit's holding
(district court's interpretation of Title VII's notice section bars claimant from federal court when
employer breached agreement). Courts should construe Title VII provisions to allow claimants
to enforce Title VII claims because Congress intended Title VII to eliminate discriminatory employ-
ment practices. See Clark v. Chasen, 619 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1980) (courts should not
impede Title VII's purpose of eliminating employment discrimination); see also H.R. REP. No.
238, 92nd Cong. 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2139 (Title
VII meant to eliminate discrimination). In enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Congress recognized that the pre-1972 enforcement procedures of the EEOC were inade-
quate to enforce effectively Title VII. Id. Congress granted the EEOC more effective enforce-
ment powers in the Equal Employment Opportunity Act. Id. The EEOC's new civil enforcement
powers included the ability to issue cease and desist orders and to file Title VII actions in federal
court. Id. With the new enforcement powers, the EEOC could help achieve Title VII's purpose
of eliminating discriminatory employment practices. Id.; see supra note 4 (discussion of EEOC's
pre-1972 enforcement powers); note 7 (discussion of post-1972 EEOC enforcement powers).
90. 690 F.2d at 1094 (Perdue able to bring Title VII suit in federal court upon proof that
employer breached settlement).
91. See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text (Perdue holding promotes effective en-
forcement of Title VII). In addition to discouraging employers from negotiating in bad faith,
the Perdue holding will also promote the elimination of discrimination by simplifying the precon-
ditions to a Title VII federal suit. See infra text accompanying notes 85-86 (Perdue court rejected
district court's strict interpretation that Title VII requires right to sue notice to satisfy Title VII's
jurisdictional prerequisites); cf. Clark v. Chasen, 619 F.2d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir. 1980) (additional
jurisdictional prerequisites impede elimination of discrimination); Hart v. J.T. Baker Chemical
Corp., 598 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1979) (congressional purpose of Title VII is to eliminate
discrimination).
92. See 690 F.2d at 1093 (interpretation of Title VII based upon policies underlying Title
VII's notice requirement); supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (Supreme Court supports
Perdue court's liberal interpretation of Title VII); supra text accompanying notes 83-85 (technical
reading of Title VII inappropriate).
93. See 690 F.2d at 1095 (policies of Title VII's notice requirement support decision that
only entitlement to right to sue notice satisfies federal jurisdiction); see also infra notes 88-94
and accompanying text (Perdue holding protects Title VII enforcement procedures).
94. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975) (time limit
signifies balancing of competing private and administrative interests); see also Note, Developments
In The Law: Employment Discrimination And Title VII Of The Civil Rights Acts of 1964, 84
HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1208 (1971) (180 day period reflects limited deference for conciliation)
[hereinafter cited as Employment Discrimination].
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achieved a sound balance of these competing interests by requiring a Title
VII claimant to comply with the available administrative remedies before
attempting civil action.9 Furthermore, the effect of Perdue is to allow a Title
VII claimant access to federal courts when that party is able to prove exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies, thereby satisfying Congress' preference for
private dispute resolution while still promoting enforcement of Title VII. 96
In addition to promoting Congress' preference for private resolution of
Title VII disputes, the Fourth Circuit's holding that a plaintiff must show
entitlement to a right to sue notice also satisfied the congressional policy of
preventing duplicitous litigation.97 In Perdue, the Fourth Circuit required Per-
due to prove entitlement by showing that the EEOC would not issue a right
to sue notice even though Stone breached the negotiated settlement. 98 The Per-
due court, therefore, required Perdue to prove that the EEOC closed the case
by proving that the EEOC would no longer act on Perdue's behalf.9 9 As a
result, the Perdue court satisfied the policy of preventing duplicitous litiga-
tion because the danger of duplicitous litigation was no longer applicable once
Perdue proved that the EEOC closed the case."'
In addition to preventing duplicitous litigation and ensuring exhaustion
of administrative remedies, Title VII's notice requirement also serves to begin
the ninety-day time limit within which the Title VII claimant must bring suit
in federal court."' The ninety-day time limit protects employers from Title
VII claimants who bring stale claims after apparently acquiescing to an
employer's discriminatory practices.0 2 The right to sue notice, however, also
95. 690 F.2d at 1095. In Perdue, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to allow Perdue
to show that Stone breached the negotiated settlement. Id. By requiring Perdue to show that
Stone had breached the negotiated settlement, the Fourth Circuit required Perdue to demonstrate
that she had exhausted the administrative remedies. Id.
96. See id. (Perdue allowed to bring Title VII action in federal court upon proof of breach
of settlement agreement); see also H.R. RP. No. 238, 92 Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1972
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws 2137, 2147-48 (180 day time limit allows individual to escape
from occasional administrative delays); Sape & Hart, Title VIl Reconsidered: The EqualEmploy-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo. WAsAH. L. REv. 824, 879-80 (1972) (180 day time limit
allows individuals to enforce Title VII).
97. 690 F.2d at 1094.
98. See id. (Perdue court remanded case to allow Perdue to prove entitlement to a right
to sue notice by demonstrating that Stone breached the settlement agreement).
99. See supra note 40 (Perdue court required Perdue on remand to prove that Perdue had
notice that EEOC would no longer act'on Perdue's behalf).
100. See Truvillion v. King's Daughters Hospital, 614 F.2d 520-527 (5th Cir. 1981) (purpose
of notice is to reduce possibility of duplicative private suits); Fields v. Village of Skokie, 502
F. Supp. 456, 458 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Congress based policy against duplicitous litigation due to
concern that EEOC be given opportunity to resolve disputes); Employment Discrimination, supra
note 94, at 1208 (Congress preferred private resolution of Title VII disputes); see also supra notes
17-18 and accompanying text (letter informing Perdue that EEOC closed case).
101. 690 F.2d at 1094; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (party has 90 days after receipt of right
to sue notice to bring private suit).
102. See Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 253 (1980) (limitations period pro-
tects employers from stale claims); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 463-64
(1975) (time limits protect employers from stale claims).
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serves the interests of Title VII claimants by formally notifying the claimants
that the EEOC has closed the case and that the ninety-day time limit has
begun. 10 3 In Perdue, the Fourth Circuit correctly equated the EEOC letter
informing Perdue that the EEOC could not issue a right to sue notice follow-
ing a negotiated settlement with a formal right to sue notice. 10 4 The EEOC
letter notified Perdue that the EEOC had closed the case and that Perdue
would have to pursue any Title VII grievance individually.' 5 The EEOC let-
ter, therefore, achieved the same effect as a right to sue letter in terms of
notifying Perdue that the EEOC closed the case.0 6 Furthermore, the Perdue
court's conclusion equating the EEOC letter and a formal right to sue notice
sufficiently protected the interests of employers from stale claims by holding
that the EEOC letter activated the ninety-day time limit.0 7 The Perdue court's
holding, therefore, satisfies the three policies underlying Title VII's notice re-
quirement promoting private dispute resolution, preventing duplicitous litiga-
tion, and protecting employers from stale claims."'
The Fourth Circuit in Perdue held that a Title VII claimant need only
prove entitlement to a right to sue notice to satisfy Title VII's jurisdictional
requirements.' 0 9 The Perdue court's holding soundly balances the underlying
policies of the right to sue notice requirement by providing a logical equivalent
to the right to sue notice."10 Furthermore, the Perdue court's holding reaf-
firms the language in past Supreme Court Title VII decisions that Title VII
grants lower courts plenary powers to broadly construe Title VII in order to
provide Title VII claimants the most complete relief possible."' Finally, the
Perdue holding expands Title VII protection within the Fourth Circuit by pro-
moting more efficient elimination of discrimination." 2
PETER BRANDON LEwIs
103. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. 12 reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws, 2137, 2147 (right to sue letter notifies aggrieved party of time limit within which
party must bring suit).
104. 690 F.2d at 1094; see supra text accompanying notes 99-101 (EEOC letter in Perdue
equivalent to formal right to sue notice).
105. See 690 F.2d at 1092 (EEOC letter informed Perdue that EEOC could not issue right
to sue notice); see also supra note 97 and accompanying text (right to sue letter notifies party
of 90 day limit).
106. See supra notes 97, 99 and accompanying text (both Perdue letter and right to sue
letter notify claimant of EEOC's decision to close case).
107. 690 F.2d at 1094. In Perdue, the Fourth Circuit protected employers from stale claims
by appointing the district court to determine when the 90-day period began. Id.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 96, 100, 107 (Perdue holding satisfies three policies
underlying Title VII's notice requirement).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42 (plaintiff need only show entitlement to right
to sue notice to maintain jurisdiction under Title VII).
110. See supra notes 93-108 and accompanying text (Perdue holding soundly balances underly-
ing policies of right to sue notice requirement).
111. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (language in past Supreme Court Title
VII cases supports reasoning and result of Perdue holding).
112. See supra notes 53-56, 81-86 and accompanying text (Perdue holding promotes more
effective enforcement of Title VII).
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B. Sexual Harassment: Stating and Proving a Claim Under Title VII
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)'
to remedy discrimination in all areas of employment by prohibiting employ-
ment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion or national origin.2
Courts recently have held that Title VII protects victims of sexual harassment
by applying Title VII to harassment that does not affect an employee's tangi-
ble job benefits, such as wages, promotion or work hours.3 This new sexual
harassment claim, called the condition of work claim, involves the creation
of a hostile or offensive work environment in violation of Title VII through
sustained verbal or physical abuse, directed at an employee because of the
employee's sex.' Since courts only recently have recognized condition of work
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (Title VII). Title VII prohibits an
employer, employment agency, labor organization or the federal government from discriminating
against an individual with respect to hiring and discharge policies or the compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of an individual's employment. Id. § 2000e-2(a)-(c), e-16. Title VII also
prohibits an employer, employment agency, labor organization or the federal government from
discriminating against an individual in retaliation for that individual's legal activities opposing
unlawful employment practices. Id. §§ 2000e-3, e-16. Title VII, however, does not require an
employer to give preferential treatment in employment practices to minority job applicants or
employees. Id. § 2000e-20). Nor does Title VII prohibit an employer, employment agency or
labor organization from discriminating against an individual because the individual is a member
of the Communist party or Communist-front organizations. Id. § 2000e-2(f). To enforce Title
VII, Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id. § 2000e-4;
see infra note 140 (powers and procedures of the EEOC).
2. See Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)
(Congress intended Title VII to prohibit all types of sex discrimination); Rogers v. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n., 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.) (courts should interpret Title VII liberally
to achieve Congress' goal of ending discrimination), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1971). Title VII
applies as equally to sex discrimination as to racial, ethnic or religious discrimination. See H.R.
REP. No. 238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. -, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE & CONG. AD NEWs 2137,
2141 (sex discrimination is no less serious than other types of unlawful discrimination). But see
Wells, Sex Discrimination And Title VII, 43 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 273, 274 (1975) (provision in
Title VII relating to sex discrimination was legislative afterthought introduced as amendment
to original bill).
3. See, e.g., Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (sustained verbal abuse that
led to existence of sexually hostile working environment constituted Title VII violation); Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982) (sexual advances unrelated to job benefits
violate Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (sexual advances
unrelated to job benefits violate Title VII).
4. See Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (sustained verbal abuse of employee
created sexually offensive work environment which violated Title VII); Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 905 (11 th Cir. 1982) (demeaning sexual inquiries and insults combined with repeated
sexual advances toward employee created offensive work environment in violation of Title VII);
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (repeated sexual advances and inquiries
toward employee violated Title VII by creating offensive work environment); Cooley v. Con-
solidated Rail Corp., 561 F. Supp. 645, 647 (E.D. Mich. 1982) (employer's constant remarks
about plaintiff's breasts and employer's recording of plaintiff's menstrual periods on office calendar
created offensive working environment which violated Title VII); Morgan v. Hertz Corp., 27
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 990, 994 (W.D. Tenn. 1981) (continuous sex-related questioning
of employee by employer created offensive working environment). Most courts have held that
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claims as violating Title VII, courts have adopted conflicting methods con-
cerning how a plaintiff proves a condition of work claim.
6
The confusion of courts concerning condition of work claims arises from
the difference between condition of work claims and the more common quid
pro quo harassment claim. 7 The quid pro quo claim involves an employer
conditioning future job benefits upon an employee's submission to the
employer's sexual advances.' Unlike condition of work claims, quid pro quo
claims require a nexus between the harassment and job benefits.9 The primary
sexual harassment creates an offensive environment if the harassment is extensive and uninvited
by the employee. See, e.g., Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903-04 (11th Cir. 1982)
(sexual harassment must be uninvited by employee and substantial enough to affect term, condi-
tion, or privilege of employment to create offensive working environment); Gan v. Kepro Circuit
Sys., 27 EmpI. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,379, at 23,648-49 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (vulgar language did
not create offensive work environment where plaintiff initiated conversations); Walter v. KFGO
Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (D.N.D. 1981) (isolated bottom-patting incidents did not create
offensive working environment); Halpert v. Wertheim & Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
21, 23-34 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (truck driver language at office did not create offensive working en-
vironment where plaintiff contributed to language).
5. See Attanasio, Equal Justice Under Chaos: The Developing Law of Sexual Harass-
ment, 51 U. CIN. L. Rav. 1, 7 (1982) (first case to recognize that sexual harassment without
tangible job detriment violated Title VII was Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981));
infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussion of Bundy holding that sexually offensive
working environment violates Title VII).
6. Compare Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 n. 11 (11th Cir. 1982) (normal
principles of pleading and proof allocation apply to condition of work claims under Title VII)
with Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1983) (Katz court established shifting allocation
of proof scheme for Title VII condition of work claims).
7. See Attanasio, supra note 5, at 6 (courts treat sexual harassment claims differently from
Title VII discrimination claims); cf. supra note 6 and accompanying text (courts differ over method
of proof for condition of work claims).
8. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 n.18 (11th Cir. 1982) (quid pro quo
harassment entails an employer demanding sexual favors from employee in exchange for job
benefits); see also Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212-13 (9th Cir. 1979) (discharge of
employee for refusing supervisor's demands for sex constituted Title VII violation); Garber v.
Saxon Business Prods. Inc., 552 F.2d 1032, 1032 (4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (employer may
violate Title VII by discharging employee for refusing supervisor's sexual advances); Tompkins
v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas, 568 F.2d 1044, 1046 (3rd Cir. 1977) (supervisor's denial of employee's
promotion in retaliation for rebuffed sexual advances violated Title VII); Barnes v. Costle, 561
F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Title VII violated if supervisor eliminated employee's job in
retaliation for rebuffed sexual advances); Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, 1388 (D.D.C.
1980) (discharge of employee for refusing supervisor's sexual advances violated Title VII); Heelan
v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978) (employer violated Title VII
by discharging employee for refusing employer's sexual advances); Munford v. James T. Barnes
& Co., 441 F. Supp. 459, 466 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (Title VII violated if employee discharged for
refusing to have sexual relations with supervisor).
9. See Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 665 (1st Cir. 1979) (plaintiff must allege nexus be-
tween sexual advances and adverse employment action to state Title VII quid pro quo claim);
Hill v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 66, 71 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (plain-
tiff must show nexus between harassment and discharge to establish prima facie case of quid
pro quo harassment); Davis v. Bristol Laboratories, 26 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1351, 1352-53
(W.D. Okla. 1981) (plaintiff must show nexus between harassment and discharge to establish
prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment); Smith v. Rust Eng'g Co., 18 Empl. Prac. Dec.
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issue in a quid pro quo claim is whether the employer intended to deny job
benefits to an employee in retaliation for rebuffed sexual advances.'I To resolve
the issue of intent in quid pro quo claims, courts generally have adopted a
variation of the Supreme Court's allocation of proof scheme in Title VII
disparate treatment claims.II
(CCH) 8698, at 4783-84 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (court dismissed quid pro quo claim because no
nexus between verbal abuse and job benefits).
10. See supra note 9 (cases denying Title VII action because sexual harassment not related
to job benefits).
11. See Hall v. F.O. Thacker Contracting Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1499, 1502
(N.D. Ga. 1980) (court applied Supreme Court's allocation of proof scheme for disparate treat-
ment claims to quid pro quo harassment claim); Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp.
1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978) (court established allocation of proof scheme for quid pro quo harass-
ment claim). See infra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (requirements of prima facie case and
allocation of burden of proof in disparate treatment claims). In applying the allocation of proof
scheme for disparate treatment claims to quidpro quo claims, courts have differed over the allocation
of proof between the parties. See Attanasio, supra note 5, at 37 (courts have applied varying
burdens to defendants in sex discrimination cases).
For example, in Hall v. F.O. Thacker Contracting Co., the District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia modified only the prima facie case requirements when adopting the disparate
treatment proof scheme to a quid pro quo claim. 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) at 1503. The
Hall court required the plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment by
demonstrating that a supervisor made sexual advances to the plaintiff, that the supervisor condi-
tioned the plaintiff's employment on submission to the advances, that the supervisor fired the
plaintiff for refusing the advances, and that the supervisor did not make similar advances to
male employees. Id. Once the plaintiff established a primafacie case of quidpro quo harassment,
the court shifted the burden of proof to the employer to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for discharging the plaintiff. Id. If the employer successfully rebutted the plaintiff's prima
facie showing of harassment, then the court allowed the plaintiff to show the employer's legitimate
reasons for firing the plaintiff were merely pretext for discrimination. Id. The court, however,
noted that the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff throughout the process.
Id.; see Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 911 n.22 (1 th Cir. 1982) (Henson court applied
disparate treatment allocation of proof scheme to quid pro quo claim).
In Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., however, the District Court for the District of Colorado
modified the allocation of proof scheme in a quidpro quo claim, placing a burden on the employer
greater than the employer's burden in disparate treatment claims. 451 F. Supp. at 1390-91. The
Heelan court required the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment
by proving that the plaintiff's submission to a supervisor's sexual advances was a condition of
plaintiff's employment, that the advances substantially affected the plaintiff's employment, and
that the advances did not affect employees of the opposite sex. Id. at 1390. Once the plaintiff
proved aprimafacie case of quidpro quo harassment, the court shifted the burden to the employer
to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by showing legitimate reasons for discharging the plain-
tiff. Id. at 1390-91. The court stated that the employer must show by the clear weight of the
evidence that the legitimate reasons for the discharge were not a pretext for discrimination. Id.;
see Williams v. Civiletti, 487 F. Supp. 1387, 1389 (D.D.C. 1980) (Williams court placed heavy
burden on defendant to rebut plaintiff's primafacie showing that supervisor discharged plaintiff
because plaintiff's affair with supervisor ended); infra note 97 (Bundy court placed heavy burden
on employer to rebut plaintiff's prima facie showing of .quid pro quo harassment if plaintiff
had already proved condition of work claim).
Unlike the Thomas court, those courts such as Heelan and Williams which place a heavy
rebuttal burden on the employer may violate the McDonnell Douglas mandate that the plaintiff
always bears the burden of persuasion in a disparate treatment claim. See Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (plaintiff always bears ultimate burden of
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Like quidpro quo harassment claims, Title VII disparate treatment claims
involve an employer denying job status or benefits to a plaintiff for
discriminatory reasons.' 2 An employer's decision regarding the hiring of per-
sonnel or extension of job benefits to employees may concern a variety of
factors such as job performance, qualifications or hiring needs.' 3 Thus the
main problem in a disparate treatment claim is determining an employer's
motives behind an adverse employment decision." Since direct proof of
discriminatory intent is hard to produce," the Supreme Court, in McDonnell
persuasion in Title VII disparate treatment claim); Attanasio, supra note 5, at 37-38 (courts which
place rebuttal burden greater than burden of production on employer violate McDonnell Douglas
precepts).
12. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977)
(disparate treatment claim involves an employer acting unfavorably toward certain people on
account of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). In a Title VII disparate treatment claim,
the central issue is whether an employer intended to discriminate against a plaintiff in making
an employment decision. Id. The intent question in disparate treatment claims distinguishes disparate
treatment claims from the other major Title VII claim, the disparate impact claim. Id.; see 2
A. LARSON & L. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DiSCRrMINATON, § 50.40, at 10-40 (1983) (disparate im-
pact cases contrast with disparate treatment cases because disparate impact cases do not involve
proof of employer's discriminatory motive). The disparate impact claim involves a facially neutral
employment policy which operates to discriminate against certain groups. See Teamsters, 431
U.S. at 335 n.15. The main issue in disparate impact claims is whether a facially neutral employ-
ment policy is job-related, or a business necessity. See 2 A. LAsON & L. LARSON, supra, § 50.40,
at 10-40; see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (test for legality of facially
neutral employment policies in disparate impact claims is whether employment policies are business
necessity). Quidpro quo harassment claims are disparate treatment claims rather than disparate
impact claims because quid pro quo claims involve the question whether an employer intention-
ally discriminated against an employee in retaliation for rebuked sexual advances. Cf. Henson
v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909-11 (1 lth Cir. 1982) (Henson court used disparate treatment
analysis for resolving intent to discriminate issue in quid pro quo harassment claim).
13. See 2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 12, § 50.70, at 10-46 to -48 (employment
decisions often involve subtle factors not definable in objective terms). Especially in professional
and non-routine jobs, subjective factors such as personality or attitude may weigh heavily on
an employer's decision to hire or promote an employee. Id. § 50.72(c), at 10-69; cf. Rowe v.
General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (court stated that promotion procedures
which depended entirely on subjective evaluation were ready mechanisms for discrimination).
14. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (ultimate
question in disparate treatment claims is whether employer intentionally discriminated against
plaintiff).
15. See Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 326 F. Supp. 397, 398-99 (D. Or. 1970) (direct
proof of discrimination is virtually impossible to obtain), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974);
2 A. LARSON & L. LARSON, supra note 12, § 50.10, at 10-4 to -6 (plaintiffs must resort to cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove discriminatory intent in disparate treatment cases because sophisticated
employers do not produce direct evidence of discrimination); Belton, Burdens of Pleading and
Proof in Discrimination Cases: Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice, 34 VAND. L. REV. 1205,
1224 (1981) (direct proof of discrimination is rare because discrimination involves subtle rather
than overt practices); Note, Sexual Harassment and Title VII: The Foundation for the Elimina-
tion of Sexual Cooperation as an Employment Condition, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 1007, 1021 (1978)
(subtle forms that employers use to discriminate against employee include failing to train employee
properly, assigning employee undesirable work, or scrutinizing employee's work product more
closely than other employees' work product); Comment, Allocations of Burdens of Proof and
Persuasion in Disparate Treatment Cases of Title VII Litigation, 39 WASH. & LEE L. RFv. 637,
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Douglas Corp. v. Green, 6 established a three-pronged allocation of proof
scheme designed to aid the trier of fact in determining whether an employer
denied job status or benefits to a plaintiff for discriminatory reasons."
In McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff claimed that McDonnell Douglas
refused to hire him because he was black.' 8 In addressing Green's disparate
treatment claim, the Court stated that to prove a disparate treatment claim
of racial discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must first prove a prima
facie case of racial discrimination' 9 by showing that the plaintiff belonged
to a racial minority, that the plaintiff was qualified for the position sought,
and that the defendant failed to hire the plaintiff when filling the position.2"
The McDonnell Douglas Court noted that the elements of a prima facie case
in disparate treatment claims will vary depending upon the particular fact situa-
tions involved.2' The Court held that once a plaintiff proves a prima facie
case of disparate treatment, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
rebut the plaintiff's primafacie case by producing evidence of legitimate, non-
639 (1982) (plaintiffs have difficulty producing direct evidence of employer's discriminatory in-
tent) [hereinafter cited as Allocations of Burdens of Proof].
16. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
17. See id. at 802-06; see also Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253 (1981) (McDonnell Douglas allocation of proof scheme helps litigants and courts resolve
question of intent to discriminate in disparate treatment claims); Attanasio, supra note 5, at 11
(Court designed McDonnell Douglas proof scheme to determine employer's intent in employment
decisions by focusing on employee's objective qualifications rather than employer's hidden
intentions).
18. 411 U.S. at 794-96. The plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas was a black engineer who worked
for defendant McDonnell Douglas until McDonnell Douglas laid him off work. Id. at 794. While
the plaintiff was laid off, he participated in an illegal "stall-in" and "lock-in" against McDon-
nell Douglas. Id. at 794-95. When McDonnell Douglas began putting laid off employees back
to work, McDonnell Douglas refused to rehire the plaintiff. Id. at 796. Plaintiff sued McDonnell
Douglas alleging that McDonnell Douglas would not hire the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's
involvement in the civil rights movement. Id. McDonnell Douglas claimed that it rejected the
plaintiff because the plaintiff participated in the illegal protests against McDonnell Douglas. Id.;
see id. at 807 (Court remanded McDonnell Douglas to allow plaintiff opportunity to prove McDon-
nell Douglas' justifications for refusing to hire plaintiff were pretext for discrimination).
19. Id. at 802; see Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) (McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case is practical way to evaluate evidence concerning discriminatory intent
of employer). Establishment of a prima facie case of disparate treatment creates an inference
of intent to discriminate by an employer. Id. Since the primafacie case only creates an inference
of discrimination, the establishment of a primafacie case is not an ultimate or conclusive finding
of fact concerning an employer's motive behind an employment decision. Id. at 579-80. The
establishment of a prima facie case merely triggers the shifting burden of proof scheme which
leads to the ultimate finding on the intent question. Id. at 577-80; see infra notes 20-24 and
accompanying text (discussion of McDonnell Douglas allocation of proof scheme for disparate
treatment cases).
20. See 411 U.S. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas court found that the plaintiff established
a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing that plaintiff was black, that McDonnell
Douglas conceded that the plaintiff qualified for the position sought, and that McDonnell Douglas
continued to seek applicants for the position after refusing to hire the plaintiff. Id.
21. Id. at 802 n.13 (McDonnell Douglas prima facie case for disparate treatment in hiring
does not apply to all fact situations).
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discriminatory reasons justifying the adverse employment action. 2 If the defen-
dant carried the burden of production, the Court required the plaintiff to show
that the defendant's justifications were not the real reasons for refusing to
hire the plaintiff but were merely pretext for the discrimination. 23 Under the
McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, however, the ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact of discriminatory intent always remains on the plaintiff.24
22. Id. at 802. An employer's burden to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie disparate treatment
showing is a burden of production. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 254-55 (1981) (employer rebuts plaintiff's prima facie disparate treatment showing by pro-
ducing through admissible evidence reasons for refusing to hire plaintiff). A burden of produc-
tion is merely a burden of going forward with enough evidence on an issue to allow the factfinder
to act on the issue. See Belton, supra note 15, at 1216 (failure to meet burden of production
on particular issue results in removal of issue from consideration of jury). The McDonnell Douglas
court determined that McDonnell Douglas met its burden of production and successfully rebutted
the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment by articulating that McDonnell Douglas
refused to hire the plaintiff because the plaintiff engaged in illegal activity against McDonnell
Douglas. See 411 U.S. at 803-04 (Title VII does not compel an employer to hire someone who
participated in illegal activity against employer).
23. 411 U.S. at 804-05. Under the McDonnell Douglas allocation of proof scheme, the
plaintiff's burden to show the employer's justifications for the adverse employment action is
a burden of persuasion. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256
(1981) (plaintiff's burden to show pretext merges with plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion
to show employer's discriminatory intent). A party with the burden of persuasion must convince
the trier of fact that certain elements exist in fact or the party will lose the case. See Belton,
supra note 15, at 1216 (party having burden of persuasion will lose if factfinder's mind is undecided
after considering all evidence). Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff meets its burden of persua-
sion by proving pretext by a preponderance of the evidence. See Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (plaintiff's burden to prove pretext merges with
plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion in disparate treatment claims).
24. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). In Bur-
dine, the Supreme Court clarified the McDonnell Douglas proof allocation scheme for disparate
treatment claims. Id. at 253-59. The plaintiff in Burdine claimed that the defendant employer
refused to promote her and eventually fired her because the plaintiff was a woman. Id. at 251.
The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate treatment
for discharge and for failure to promote by showing that the plaintiff qualified for a job which
the employer gave to a male employee of inferior qualifications. See Burdine v. Texas Dep't
of Community Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 568 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated, 450 U.S. 248 (1981). The
Fifth Circuit then held that the employer did not rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case because
the employer failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence legitimate, non-discriminatory
reasons for the adverse employment action. Id. at 567, 569. The employer appealed, alleging
that the Fifth Circuit misallocated the employer's burden of proof to rebut the plaintiff's prima
facie case. See 450 U.S. at 251-52.
The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff and reversed the Fifth Circuit, holding that
the Fifth Circuit erred in requiring the defendants to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case by
a preponderance of the evidence. 450 U.S. at 256-57. The Burdine Court stated that establishing
a prima facie case merely creates an inference of discriminatory intent. Id. at 253-54. The Court
explained that the defendant's burden to rebut this inference is a burden of production which
the defendant carries by raising a genuine issue of fact about the question of intent to discriminate.
Id. at 254-55; see supra note 22 (burden of production is burden of going forward with enough
evidence to allow factfinder to act on issue). Since Title VII does not require employers to give
preferential treatment to minorities, the Court declared that an employer need only explain clear-
ly legitimate reasons for the employer's actions in order to carry its burden of production and
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment. 450 U.S. at 257. The Court then
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Although courts generally have applied the McDonnell Douglas alloca-
tion of proof scheme to quid pro quo claims,"3 the Fourth Circuit in Katz
v. Dole26 recently decided that the McDonnell Douglas burden of proof scheme
did not apply to condition of work claims because the dominant question of
discriminatory intent in disparate treatment claims is absent from the condi-
tion of work harassment claim." In Katz, the plaintiff Deborah Ann Katz
was the only female working on a federal air traffic control crew.28 From
May 1977 to May 1981 Katz's co-workers and supervisors subjected Katz to
continual sexual harassment and verbal abuse. 29 Although Katz complained
of the harassment to John J. Sullivan, the control crew's supervisor, Sullivan
took no action to remedy the situation. 0 Instead, Sullivan responded to Katz's
complaints with further sexual harassment.' In addition, Sullivan denied Katz's
request for transfer to another crew, and denied Katz's requests regarding
the scheduling of Katz's familiarization rides on airplanes. 32 When Katz sus-
tained injuries in a fall, Sullivan initially placed Katz on regular sick leave
rather than traumatic injury leave.3 3 Traumatic injury leave provides more
benefits to employees than does sick leave.3 4 Katz finally arranged with Sullivan
stated that once the defendant has rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to prove that the defendant's legitimate reasons for the employment actions were
actually pretext for discrimination. Id. at 255-56. The Court noted that the plaintiff could prove
pretext by persuading a court that discriminatory intent more likely than not motivated the adverse
employment decision or that the defendant's justifications for the adverse employment action
were not credible. Id. at 256. Additionally, the Burdine Court noted that the ultimate burden
of persuasion to prove the defendant's intent to discriminate always remains with the plaintiff.
Id. at 253; see Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 29 (1978)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (defendant has burden to produce legitimate reasons for employment
action but plaintiff always has burden of persuasion to prove discriminatory intent). The Burdine
Court stated that at the last stage of the proof scheme the plaintiff's burden to prove pretext
merges with plaintiff's ultimate burden of persuasion to prove the defendant's intent to discriminate.
450 U.S. at 256.
25. See supra note I I and accompanying text (courts generally apply McDonnell Douglas
application of proof scheme to quid pro quo harassment claims).
26. 709 F.2d 251 (4th Cir. 1983).
27. Id. at 255.
28. Id. at 253. As an air traffic controller, the plaintiff in Katz was an employee of the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Id.
29. Id. at 253-54. In Katz, witnesses testified at trial that employees often referred to Katz
using obscene words. Id. The Fourth Circuit described the words as widely recognized to be in-
tensely degrading. Id. at 254. See generally C. MILLER & K. SWr, WORDS AND WOMEN 109
(1977) (certain words offend people not only because of meaning but also because of disgust
and violence in pronunciation of words). Conversations at Katz's workplace also centered on
Katz's sexual abilities). See 709 F.2d at 254 (supervisor claimed he would accept transfer of Katz
to his unit because of Katz's sexual prowess).
30. 709 F.2d at 254.
31. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Katz stated that when Katz complained to Sullivan about
the sexual advances of another employee, Sullivan remarked that the harassment would stop if
Katz would submit to the advances. Id.
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to transfer to another crew in May, 1981. 3" In June, 1981, Katz brought suit
against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for sexual harassment in
violation of Title VII. 36 The FAA subsequently fired Katz in September 1981
for illegally striking against the government.
37
At trial in the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Katz
claimed that the verbal abuse she suffered while a member of Sullivan's crew
was sexual harassment which violated Title VII. 8 Katz also claimed that
Sullivan's denial of Katz's transfer and leave requests, and Sullivan's denial
of Katz's plans for scheduling familiarization flights, was disparate treatment
constituting gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. 3 9 The trial court
ruled for the FAA on both the sexual harassment and disparate treatment
claims, holding that Katz failed to establish that the FAA intended to
discriminate against Katz."0 Consequently, Katz appealed the trial court's
holding to the Fourth Circuit.' On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's holding regarding the disparate treatment claim, and reversed the
trial court's holding regarding the sexual harassment claim.42
In addressing Katz's sexual harassment claim, the Fourth Circuit iden-
tified Katz's claim as a condition of work claim rather than a quid pro quo
claim because Katz alleged that her employer's demeaning sexual related
behavior toward her created an offensive working environment.43 The Katz
court held that the creation of such an offensive work environment violated
Title VII.44 Furthermore, the court noted that since sexual harassment is almost
35. Id. at 253.
36. See id. (named defendant in Katz was Secretary of Transportation who is FAA's superior).
37. Id.
38. See id. (Katz alleged that sexual harassment which she received created intimidating
and offensive working environment in violation of Title VII).
39. Id.; see supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text (analysis of Title VII disparate treat-
ment claims); supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text (McDonnell Douglas allocation of proof
scheme for proving disparate treatment claims).
40. 709 F.2d at 253.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 257.
43. Id. at 255. The Katz court stated that although Katz suffered some quid pro quo harass-
ment, Katz's claim was a condition of work claim because Katz alleged in her complaint that
the sexual harassment created an offensive work environment. Id.
44. Id. at 254. The Katz court's holding that sexual harassment which created an offensive
working environment violated Title VII is analogous to court decisions holding that racial harass-
ment which created an offensive environment violated Title VII. See Henson v. City of Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (11 th Cir. 1982) (sexual harassment which creates offensive environment prevents
sexual equality just as racially offensive environment prevents racial equality); Bundy v. Jackson,
641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (relevance of sexually offensive environment claims to racially
offensive environment claims is beyond dispute); see also Taylor v. Jones, 653 F.2d 1193, 1199
(8th Cir. 1981) (racially offensive atmosphere in Arkansas National Guard constituted Title VII
violation); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 515 (8th
Cir. 1977) (court stopped fireman's use of segregated supper clubs because clubs promoted
discriminatory atmosphere), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 938 (1980); Rogers v. Equal Employment Op-
portunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234, 238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (creation of racially offensive environ-
ment violated Title VII), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
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always intentional," the primary issue in condition of work claims is whether
the employer is liable for the harassment under the doctrine of respondeat
superior." The doctrine of respondeat superior provides that an employer is
liable for the wrongful acts of the employer's employee committed during the
course of employment.47 Since condition of work claims involve the question
of respondeat superior rather than the question of intentional discrimination,
the Katz court separated Katz's condition of work claim from Katz's disparate
treatment claim."0
The Katz court then established a two-pronged test for proving liability
in condition of work claims. 49 Under the Katz court's two-pronged test, a
plaintiff must first establish a primafacie case of sexual harassment by show-
ing that substantial, continuing sexual harassment occurred."0 The court stated
45. See 709 F.2d at 255 (Katz court stated that sexual advance or insult is almost always
intentional assault on individual's privacy) (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 945 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)). The Bundy court stated that although some forms of sex discrimination, such as
dress codes, may not necessarily indicate intentional discrimination, harassment of an employee
through sustained sexual insults and advances is usually intentional. 641 F.2d at 945.
46. 704 F.2d at 255.
47. See generally Note, The Responsibility of Employers For The Actions of Their Employees:
The Negligent Hiring Theory of Liability, 53 Cm.-KETr L. REV. 717, 718 (1978) (employer is
vicariously liable for wrongful acts employee committed in scope of employee's employment).
An employee acts within the scope of his employment when the employee furthers the employer's
interest. Id. The common law, however, provided four exceptions for holding employers liable
for the acts of employees even though the employees did not act within the scope of the employees'
employment. See Restatement (Second) of Agency § 219(2) (1958). Under the common law excep-
tions to the scope of employment rule an employer is liable for his employee's acts if the employee
intended the consequences, if the employer was negligent, if the conduct violated a duty which
the employer could not delegate to the employee, or if the employee pretended to act under ap-
parent authority from the employer. Id.
Sexual harassment is an intentional tort and therefore outside the scope of an employee's
employment. See Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Mackinnon, J., concur-
ring) (employee sexually harassing another employee does not act within scope of employment).
Consequently, courts have held employers liable for sexual harassment if the employer negli-
gently allowed harassment to occur. See Tompkins v. Public Ser. Elec. & Gas Co., 568 F.2d
1044, 1048-49 (3rd Cir. 1977) (court stated that plaintiff must show employer had actual or con-
structive knowledge of harassment in order to hold employer liable for harassment); Barnes v.
Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 993 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer may avoid liability for harassment by show-
ing prompt remedial action taken to end harassment). Other courts have held an employer liable
for the harassing acts of an employee if the employee was acting within his apparent authority
when harassing other employees. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1 1th Cir.
1982) (employer is strictly liable for harassment by supervisors which causes tangible job detri-
ment for employee); Hall v. F.O. Thacker Contracting Co., 24 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
1499, 1503 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (employer liable for supervisors' harassment of employee where harass-
ment related to job benefits). See generally Attanasio, supra note 5, at 30-34 (discussing vicarious
liability of employers in sexual harassment cases).
48. 709 F.2d at 255.
49. See id. at 255-56 (Katz court stated that plaintiff asserting sexual harassment claim
must show that harassment occurred and that employer was responsible for harassment to prove
Title VII violation).
50. Id. at 256. The Katz court's requirement that sexual harassment must be continual and
extensive to create an offensive working environment is similar to other courts' requirements
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that an employer may rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case of sexual harass-
ment by proving that the harassment did not occur, or by showing that the
plaintiff suffered only isolated and trivial acts of harassment. 5' Second, the
court determined that the plaintiff must prove respondeat superior by show-
ing that the employer knew or should have known about the harassment but
made no effective effort to stop the harassment. 2 The court stated that a
plaintiff can prove the employer knew or should have known of the harass-
ment by showing that the plaintiff complained of the harassment to the
employer or by showing that the harassment was so extensive that the harass-
ment could not have escaped the employer's notice. 3 The court, however,
acknowledged that the employer may rebut the plaintiff's showing of respondeat
superior either directly by proving that the employer had no knowledge of
the harassment or indirectly by showing measures that the employer took to
end the harassment."' The court maintained that the employer's burden to
rebut the plaintiff's showing of respondeat superior was especially heavy if
supervisory personnel were either party to or privy to 'the harassment because
such actions by supervisory personnel indicate unmistakable acquiesence in
or approval of the harassment." The court, however, noted that the ultimate
burden of persuasion concerning the existence of intentional harassment re-
mains with the plaintiff throughout the two-pronged test.5 6
Applying the two-pronged test for liability in condition of work harass-
ment cases to the facts in Katz, the Fourth Circuit determined that Katz had
established a prima facie case of harassment by showing a pattern or practice
of sustained sexual harassment. 7 As support for its finding that Katz had
established a prima facie case, the court noted that the testimony of witnesses
for both Katz and the FAA showed that the harassment was extensive and
non-trivial.5 The Katz court then stated that the defendants failed to produce
for showing that racial harassment created an offensive working environment violating Title VII.
See, e.g., Johnson v. Bunny Bread Co., 646 F.2d 1250, 1257 (8th Cir. 1981) (infrequent and
casual racial slurs did not constitute Title VII violation because they did not create an offensive
environment); Spearman v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 505 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. Mo. 1980)
(isolated touching incident and racial slur did not violate Title VII), aff'd, 662 F.2d 509 (1981);
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n. v. Murphy Freight Lines, 488 F. Supp. 381, 384-85
(D. Minn. 1980) (racial jokes and abuse were continuous enough to violate Title VII); but see
Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1982) (con-
tinuous derogatory racial remarks did not create an offensive environment where plaintiff re-
mained on friendly relations with co-workers).
51. 709 F.2d at 256. But see Comment, Sexual Harassment and Title VII, 51 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 148, 164 n.76 (isolated incident of harassment may be abusive enough to create offensive
environment).
52. 709 F.2d at 256; see supra note 47 (discussion of respondeat superior issue in Title
VII sexual harassment claims).
53. 709 F.2d at 256.
54. Id.
55. Id.; see supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussion of respondeat superior issue






evidence to rebut Katz's prima facie case of sexual harassment.59 The court
further found that Katz proved respondeat superior by establishing that Katz
complained to Sullivan about the harassment, and that the harassment was
so extensive that the FAA should have known about the harassment.60 Although
the FAA established the existence of an official policy against sexual harass-
ment, the court determined that the mere existence of the policy did not serve
to rebut Katz's showing of respondeat superior because the policy was inef-
fective and Sullivan's supervisors knew the policy was ineffective.6 ' Since both
Katz's primafacie showing of sexual harassment and her showing of respondeat
superior remained unrebutted, the Fourth Circuit held that the FAA was liable
for the harassment Katz suffered.62
After finding that Katz proved her sexual harassment claim, the Fourth
Circuit addressed Katz's disparate treatment claim. 63 The Katz court stated
that Katz established a prima facie case of disparate treatment by proving
that Katz had scheduling problems concerning familiarization flights that male
employees did not have. 64 The court also stated that Katz proved a prima
facie case of disparate treatment by showing that Sullivan denied Katz's transfer
requests, and that Sullivan refused to place Katz on traumatic injury leave.65
The Katz court, however, found that the FAA rebutted Katz's prima facie
case by establishing nondiscriminatory reasons for the FAA's treatment of
Katz. 66 First, the court determined that the demands of Katz's training pro-
gram prevented her from taking familiarization rides at certain times. 67 Se-
cond, the court determined that Sullivan could not grant Katz's transfer re-
quests because no open positions existed on the crew Katz preferred.68 Third,
the court found that at the time Sullivan denied Katz traumatic injury leave
most FAA supervisors did not understand the new provisions for traumatic
injury leave. 69 Consequently, the court maintained that Sullivan's refusal to
allow Katz the leave was the result of a misunderstanding rather than because
of a discriminatory motive.7" The Fourth Circuit then noted that Katz failed
to introduce evidence to demonstrate that the FAA's articulated reasons for
her adverse treatment were actually a pretext for discrimination.' Since Katz
59. Id.; see see supra note 51 and accompanying text (Katz court stated that employer can
rebut plaintiff's prima facie case by showing that harassment consisted of isolated incidents).




64. Id.; see supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text (McDonnell Douglas requirements
for establishing prima facie case of disparate treatment).
65. 709 F.2d at 256.
66. Id.; see supra note 22 and accompanying text (employer's burden to rebut plaintiff's
primafacie case in Title VII disparate treatment claims); supra note 24 (Burdine Court's analysis
of defendant's burden to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment).




71. Id.; see supra note 23 and accompanying text (plaintiff must show that employer's
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failed to overcome the FAA's rebuttal of her prima facie case, the Katz court
affirmed the district court's ruling for the FAA on the disparate treatment
claim. 2
Prior to the Fourth Circuit's decision in Katz, two other circuit courts
had held that sexual harassment which created an offensive working environ-
ment violated Title VII.7 3 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit Court
of Appeals in Bundy v. Jackson14 was the first court to hold that sexual harass-
ment could constitute a violation of Title VII in the absence of proof of a
tangible job detriment.7" In Bundy, a supervisor of plaintiff Sarah Bundy
repeatedly made sexual advances to Bundy at the office.76 Although Bundy
complained of the harassment to other supervisors, the supervisors did not
act to remedy the situation." When Bundy became eligible for promotion,
Bundy's supervisor informed Bundy that the supervisor could not recommend
Bundy for a promotion because of a promotion freeze. 8 Bundy later learned
that the supervisor recommended the promotion of other male employees
despite the promotion freeze."9 Bundy subsequently brought a Title VII ac-
tion against Bundy's employer in the District Court for the District of Colum-
bia, claiming that the supervisor's sexual advances were sexual harassment
in violation of Title VII.80 Bundy also claimed that she suffered disparate treat-
ment- in violation of Title VII because the supervisor failed to recommend
justification for adverse employment action was pretext for discrimination in order to prove disparate
treatment claim).
72. 709 F.2d at 257. In Katz, Katz argued that since the district court erred in ruling on
Katz's condition of work claim, the Katz court should also reverse the district court's ruling
on the disparate treatment claim. Id. The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected Katz's argument
because the condition of work and disparate treatment claims were separate and independent
claims. See id. (Katz court stated that condition of work claim presented novel legal question
whereas courts have settled questions over resolution of disparate treatment claims). But see infra
note 92 and accompanying text (District of Columbia Circuit in Bundy held that proof of condi-
tion of work claim alters allocation of proof in disparate treatment claims).
73. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (sexual harassment
which created offensive work environment violated Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,
946 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (sexual advances creating offensive work environment violated Title VII).
74. 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
75. See Attanasio, supra note 5, at 7. Although Bundy was the first federal circuit court
to recognize that sexual harassment without tangible job detriment is a Title VII violation, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in an earlier case used analogies to Title VII cases to rule that sexual
harassment creating an offensive work environment violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act.
See Continental Can Co. v. State of Minnesota, 297 N.W.2d 241, 249 (Minn. 1980) (offensive
working environment violated Minnesota Human Rights Act if employer knew of offensive en-
vironment and did not act to remedy environment); MrwN. STAT. § 363.03 (Supp. 1983).
76. 641 F.2d at 939-40. The Bundy court stated that Bundy's supervisor also questioned
Bundy about her sexual proclivities. Id.
77. Id. at 940. The Bundy court stated that the supervisor responded to Bundy's complaint
by making a sexual advance toward Bundy. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See Bundy v. Jackson, 19 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 828, 829 (D.D.C. 1979) (Bundy
claimed that working conditions were more onerous for her than for male, employees), rev'd,
641 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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Bundy for promotion in retaliation for the rebuffed sexual advances.8 ' The
district court ruled for the employer on the condition of work harassment
claim, holding that sexual harassment without tangible job detriment does not
violate Title VII.82 The district court also ruled for the employer on the disparate
treatment claim, holding that the employer had established legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for denying Bundy's promotion by showing that Bundy's
work record did not merit a promotion.8 3 Bundy subsequently appealed the
district court's decision to the District of Columbia Circuit Court."4 On ap-
peal, the Bundy court reversed the district court's rulings on both the condi-
tion of work and disparate treatment claims.8
The Bundy court first addressed Bundy's condition of work claim, holding
that sexual harassment which created an offensive work environment violated
Title VII.86 The court stated that Bundy proved a condition of work claim
by showing that the employer permitted a pattern or practice of sexual harass-
ment to exist at the workplace by allowing Bundy's supervisor to make con-
tinual sexual advances to her. 7 The court then determined that Bundy
demonstrated that Bundy's employer permitted the harassment by showing
that Bundy's supervisors participated in the harassment and that the employer,
after learning of the harassment, did not act to remedy the situation. The
Bundy court stated that Bundy had proved a pattern of harassment by show-
ing that substantial rather than isolated and trivial harassment occurred.8 Since
Bundy proved that her employer permitted a pattern of sexual harassment
at the office, the Bundy court ruled for Bundy on the condition of work claim.90
After addressing Bundy's condition of work claim, the Bundy court
reversed the district court's ruling on the disparate treatment claim because
the district court did not allocate properly the burden of proof between the
parties.9 ' Although the court termed Bundy's denial of promotion claim a
81. Id. at 829.
82. Id. at 832. The district court in Bundy ruled that the harassment Bundy suffered did
not affect a term or condition of Bundy's employment and, therefore, did not violate Title VII.
Id. Additionally, the district court found that neither Bundy nor her supervisors took the harass-
ment seriously. Id.
83. Id. In support of its finding that Bundy's work record did not merit a promotion,
the district court in Bundy stated that Bundy took extraordinary amounts of sick leave from
work, that Bundy failed to file required reports, and that Bundy did not make as many field
contacts as other similarly situated employees. Id. at 829-30. In addition, the court found that
Bundy's employer promoted Bundy as fast or faster than male employees. Id. at 832.
84. 641 F.2d at 938.
85. Id. at 946, 953.
86. Id. at 943. In support of its holding that a sexually offensive environment violates Title
VII, the Bundy court relied on Title VII cases which had held that a racially offensive environ-
ment violated Title VII. Id. at 944-45; see supra note 44 (cases holding that racially offensive
environment violated Title VII).
87. 641 F.2d at 946.
88. Id. at 943.
89. Id. at 946.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 950. Since the Bundy court ruled that the trial court applied the wrong allocation
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disparate treatment claim, the Bundy court treated the claim like a quid pro
quo claim because Bundy alleged that her supervisor denied her a promotion
in retaliation for Bundy's rejection of the supervisor's sexual advances. 92 The
court held that the existence of an offensive work environment in violation
of Title VII mandated a change in the burden of proof scheme for quid pro
quo claims because once a plaintiff proves a condition of work claim the plain-
tiff has shown that the defendant discriminates against employees. 9 Since a
plaintiff who has established a condition of work claim already has proven
that the defendant discriminates against employees, the court determined that
the plaintiff should not have to reprove the defendant's discriminatory intent
in a quid pro quo claim.9 ' Consequently the court modified the McDonnell
Douglas allocation of proof scheme for cases involving both quid pro quo
and condition of work claims. 9 The Bundy court stated that Bundy could
prove a prima facie case of quid pro quo harassment by first proving that
Bundy suffered a pattern of sexual harassment attributable to her employer,
and then showing that the employer denied Bundy a promotion for which
Bundy was eligible.96 The court held that once Bundy established aprimafacie
case of quid pro quo harassment the burden would shift to the employer to
prove that the employer had legitimate reasons for denying the promotion.
97
of proof scheme to Bundy's quidpro quo claim, the Bundy court did not rule on the correctness
of the trial court's findings of fact. Id.; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (trial court
found that Bundy did not merit promotion). The Bundy court, however, stated that if the court
were to rule on the trial court's findings of fact, the court might reject the findings as clearly
erroneous because the supervisors who evaluated Bundy's work were the supervisors involved
in the harassment. 641 F.2d at 950.
92. Id. at 948. Although the Bundy court termed Bundy's claim for promotion a disparate
treatment claim, the claim was a quid pro quo claim because Bundy alleged that her employer
denied Bundy the promotion in retaliation for Bundy's rejection of the employer's sexual ad-
vances. See id. at 953 (court describes Bundy's claim as claim for denial of promotion in
retaliation for rebuffed sexual advances); see supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (relation-
ship of quid pro quo and disparate claims).
93. See 641 F.2d at 952 (Bundy court determined that court should ease plaintiff's burden
of establishing prima facie case of disparate treatment once plaintiff had proven discrimination
occurred through harassment). Proof of discrimination through harassment is evidence of an
employer's intent to discriminate against an employee. See Hatton v. Ford Motor Co., 508 F.
Supp. 620, 630-31 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (existence of racist work environment is evidence of employer's
intent to discriminate); cf. Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 444-45 (5th
Cir.) (court placed heavy rebuttal burden on employer to show legitimate reasons for adverse
employment action against employee where employee belonged to plaintiff's class which employer
discriminated against), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1033 (1974). See generally Attanasio, supra note
5, at I1, 25 (employer's sex-related behavior towards employee creates inference of discrimina-
tion when coupled with adverse employment action).
94. 641 F.2d at 952.
95. See id. at 953.
96. Id. The Bundy court noted that the major benefit of the court's new prima facie case
requirements for quid pro quo claims involving the denial of a promotion is that the plaintiff
does not have to present evidence of other employees, with qualifications similar to plaintiff's,
who received a promotion at the time the plaintiff did not receive a promotion. Id.
97. Id. The Bundy court stated that the employer's burden to rebut the plaintiff's prima
facie case of quidpro quo harassment was to establish by clear and convincing evidence legitimate
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The court noted that if the employer successfully rebutted the plaintiff's prima
facie case, then the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the defendant's
justifications for denying the promotion were merely a pretext for
discrimination. 98 Since the trial court improperly allocated the evidentiary
burden, the Bundy court remanded the quid pro quo claim to the district court
for a new trial according to the court's allocation of proof scheme.99
Although the Bundy court held that proof of a condition of work claim
eases the plaintiff's burden to establish a quid pro quo claim,' 0 the Eleventh
Circuit in Henson v. City of Dundee"0 ' separated completely a plaintiff's con-
dition of work claim from the plaintiff's quid pro quo claim.'I 2 The plaintiff
in Henson was a female police dispatcher who suffered verbal abuse and sex-
ual advances from the chief of police.' 3 Henson complained of the harass-
ment to the city manager, claiming that the police chief kept Henson from
attending the police academy because she had rebuffed the chief's sexual
advances.' 4 The city manager, however, did not act to remedy the situation. 05
Henson subsequently brought suit against the City of Dundee, Florida, claim-
ing that she suffered sexual harassment which created an offensive environ-
ment in violation of Title VII, 0 6 and that her exclusion from the policy academy
was disparate treatment in violation of Title VII.' 0 7 The district court ruled
for the defendant on the condition of work claim, holding that sexual harass-
ment must affect job benefits to violate Title VII? ° The district court also
ruled for the defendant on the disparate treatment claim, reasoning that the
police chief did not condition Henson's attendance at the policy academy on
reasons for the adverse employment actions. Id. By clear and convincing evidence the Bundy
court meant more than a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; see supra note 23 (preponderance
of evidence is one standard courts use in setting standard for burden of persuasion). The Bundy
clear and convincing evidence standard may no longer be valid after the Supreme Court's holding
in Burdine that a defendant's burden to rebut a plaintiff's primafacie case of disparate treatment
amounts to a burden of production. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450
U.S. 248, 257-58 (1981); supra note 24 (Burdine's clarification of McDonnell Douglas allocation
of proof scheme for disparate treatment claims).
98. 641 F.2d at 953.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text (Bundy court ruled that proof of condi-
tion of work claim eases plaintiff's burden on quid pro quo claim).
101. 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
102. See id. at 906 (Henson court stated that trial court's error regarding condition of work
claim did not affect trial court's resolution of separate quidpro quo claim); infra note 128 and
accompanying text (Henson court rejefted Bundy allocation of proof scheme for quid pro quo
claim where plaintiff had already proven condition of work claim).




107. Id. at 899-900. In Henson, Henson claimed that her resignation from the police depart-
ment was a constructive discharge constituting disparate treatment under Title VII because the
harassment forced her to resign. Id.; see infra note 109 (Henson district court ruled for defen-
dants on Henson's constructive discharge claim).
108. 682 F.2d at 900-901.
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submission to the chief's sexual advances.' 9 Henson appealed the district
court's ruling to the Eleventh Circuit."t0
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Bundy court that sexual
harassment which created an offensive working environment violated Title
VII.I' The Henson court then outlined the criteria of a prima facie case for
a condition of work claim." 2 First, the court maintained that the plaintiff
must belong to a protected group and must have suffered uninvited sexual
harassment.' 3 Furthermore, the court stated that the harassment must have
been based on sex' '4 and have affected a term, condition or privilege of the
plaintiff's employment."I5 As the final element of the prima facie case for
a condition of work claim, the court maintained that the plaintiff must prove
respondeat superior by demonstrating that the employer knew or should have
known of the harassment and that the employer made no attempt to stop
the harassment." 6 Although the Henson court established the elements of a
prima facie case for condition of work claims, the court did not establish an
allocation of proof scheme for condition of work cases. '" The court reasoned
that the intent to discriminate question which necessitates the use of the McDon-
nell Douglas burden of proof scheme in disparate treatment cases was absent
in harassment cases because sexual harassment was almost always intentional."0
109. Id. at 901. The Henson court stated that the district court did not believe that Henson's
resignation was a constructive discharge but that Henson resigned because another police officer
with whom Henson was having an affair left the department. Id.
110. Id. at 899.
111. Id. at 902.
112. Id. at 903-906.
113. Id. at 903. The Henson court stated that for purposes of gender discrimination a plain-
tiff belongs to a protected group by virtue of being a man or a woman. Id. The court also stated
that sexual harassment is uninvited if the employee did not initiate or solicit the harassment.
Id.; see Gan v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 27 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 32,379, at 23,649 (E.D. Mo.
1982) (plaintiff failed to establish prima facie case of harassment because plaintiff encouraged
harassment through sexual suggestions and profane comments); Vinson v. Taylor, 23 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 37, 42 (D.D.C. 1980) (court found that plaintiff's affair with employer was
voluntary and consequently was not condition of plaintiff's employment).
114. 682 F.2d at 903-904. The Henson court determined that sexual harassment is based
on sex if an employer harasses members of one sex but not members of the other sex. See id.
(Henson court stated that no discrimination exists if employer makes sexual advances to members
of both sexes because employer treats men and women same); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983,
990 n.55 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (employer's bisexual advances would not constitute gender discrimina-
tion because employer is treating both sexes alike).
115. See 682 F.2d at 904 (Henson court stated that harassment affects terms or conditions
of employment if harassment is substantial enough to create an offensive working environment).
116. 682 F.2d at 905. The Henson court noted that a plaintiff can prove an employer's
knowledge of the harassment by showing that plaintiff complained of the harassment to manage-
ment personnel. Id. The court also noted that a plaintiff can create an inference of an employer's
knowledge of the harassment by showing the harassment was pervasive. Id.
117. See 628 F.2d at 905 n.11 (Henson court stated normal pleading and proof principles
apply to condition of work claims).
118. See id. The Henson court stated that intent to discriminate is only an issue in condition
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The court concluded that normal pleading and burden of proof principles
should apply to condition of work cases under Title VI." 9
Having established the requirements for a prima facie case in a condition
of work claim, the Eleventh Circuit addressed the facts of Henson's case and
held that Henson established a prima facie case of sexual harassment. 2 The
court stated that Henson belonged to a protected group because she was a
woman.' 2' The court further stated that Henson did not invite the
harassment.' 2 The court then found that the alleged harassment was based
on sex because the police chief did not make sexual advances to male
employees.' 23 Furthermore, the court maintained that the harassment affected
a term, condition or privilege of Henson's employment since Henson had suf-
fered continual, as opposed to isolated or trivial, harassment., 24 The court
also maintained that Henson proved respondeat superior by showing the
employer knew of the harassment because Henson complained about the harass-
ment to the city manager. 2 5 Consequently, the Henson court reversed the trial
court's holding that Henson failed to prove her condition of work claim.' 6
After ruling on Henson's condition of work claim, the Henson court ad-
dressed Henson's quidpro quo claim. 2 The Henson court rejected the Bundy
court's allocation of proof scheme for quidpro quo cases which also involve
condition of work claims because the Bundy requirement that the employer
rebut the plaintiff's prima facie quid pro quo case by clear and convincing
evidence places too heavy a burden on the employer.' 2 8 Consequently, the Hen-
son court separated Henson's quid pro quo claim from her condition of work
claim.' 29 The court stated that although the district court applied the correct
allocation of proof scheme to Henson's quidpro quo claim, the district court's
findings of fact concerning the relationship between the police chief's sexual
advances and Henson's attendance at the police academy were clearly
of work claims if the employer made bisexual advances to employees. See id.; supra note 114
(bisexual advances would not constitute discrimination based on sex).
119. 682 F.2d at 905 n.ll.
120. Id. at 905.
121. Id.; see supra note 113 and accompanying text (Henson court's requirements for inclu-
sion in protected group).
122. 682 F.2d at 905; see supra note 113 and accompanying text (Henson court's definition
of uninvited harassment).
123. 682 F.2d at 905; see supra note 114 and accompanying text (Henson court's definition
of "based on sex").
124. 682 F.2d at 905; see supra note 115 and accompanying text (Henson court's definition
of "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment").
125. 682 F.2d at 905; see supra note 116 and accompanying text (Henson court's definition
of respondeat superior); supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussion of respondeat superior
in sexual harassment cases).
126. 682 F.2d at 905.
127. Id. at 906.
128. Id. at 906 n.14; see supra notes 93-97 and accompanying text (Bundy court's allocation
of proof scheme for quid pro quo cases if plaintiff has proven condition of work claim).
129. 682 F.2d at 907.
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erroneous. 3 ' The Henson court then reversed the trial court's ruling on the
quid pro quo claim and remanded the case for a new trial." '
Although the Henson and Bundy courts applied different allocation of
proof schemes to sexual harassment cases involving both condition of work
and quid pro quo claims,' 32 the Katz court did not address the differences
between the Henson and Bundy decisions.' 33 The Katz court instead rejected
the Henson and Bundy courts' allocation of proof schemes and created a third
allocation of proof scheme for condition of work claims. 31 In establishing
the new proof scheme, the Katz court did not address the Henson court's
determination that special allocation of proof schemes are inappropriate for
condition of work claims. 135 Although the Katz court kept the condition of
work claim separate from the disparate treatment claim, the court did not
address the merits of the Bundy court's decision to alter the proof scheme
in a quid pro quo claim once the plaintiff had proven a condition of work
claim. 3 6 Nor did the Katz court mention the merits of the Henson court's
decision to reject the Bundy court's altered proof scheme for quid pro quo
cases.' 37 The question concerning the relationship of condition of work and
quidpro quo claims is relevant to Katz even though Katz involved a disparate
treatment claim because the primary issue in both disparate treatment claims
and quid pro quo claims is whether the employer intended to discriminate
against the plaintiff.131 Since the Katz court proposed the new proof scheme
130. Id. at 911-12. Specifically, the Henson court disagreed with the trial court's findings
that Henson's supervisor never propositioned Henson and that no male police officers from the
department had attended the police academy. Id. at 911; see supra note 109 and accompanying
text (Henson trial court rejected Henson's quid pro quo claim).
131. 682 F.2d at 912-13.
132. Compare Henson, 682 F.2d at 906 n.14 (Henson court separated condition of work
claim from quidpro quo claim) with Bundy, 641 F.2d at 952-53 (court stated that proof of condi-
tion of work claim eases plaintiff's burden on quid pro quo claim).
133. See 709 F.2d at 256-57 (Katz court resolved Katz's disparate treatment claim without
referring to Henson or Bundy).
134. See 709 F.2d at 255-56 (Katz court's allocation of proof scheme for condition of work
claims).
135. See id. (Katz court established allocation of proof scheme for condition of work claims
without referring to Henson); 682 F.2d at 905 n.l1 (Henson court stated normal principles of
pleading and proof allocation apply to condition of work claims).
136. See 709 F.2d at 257 (Katz court held that proof of condition of work claim did not
affect resolution of disparate treatment claim); 641 F.2d at 953 (Bundy court held that proof
of condition of work claim alters burden of proof in quid pro quo claim).
137. See 709 F.2d at 257 (Katz court held that proof of condition of work claim did not
affect disparate treatment claim); 682 F.2d at 906 n.14 (Henson court rejected Bundy's allocation
of proof scheme for quid pro quo cases).
138. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text (courts use similar allocation of proof
schemes for quid pro quo and disparate treatment claims because both claims involve question
of employer's intent to discriminate). The relationship between a condition of work claim and
a disparate treatment claim is the same as the relationship between a condition of work claim
and a quid pro quo claim because proof of a condition of work claim suggests discriminatory
intent in both disparate treatment and quidpro quo claims. See supra note 93 and accompanying
text (Bundy court stated that existence of discriminatorily offensive environment is evidence of
employer's intent to discriminate).
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for condition of work cases without discussing the conflicts between Bundy
and Henson, the Katz opinion does little to settle the confusion among courts
over proving sexual harassment claims.139
Before the Bundy, Henson and Katz courts ruled that sexual harassment
creating an offensive work environment violated Title VII, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)'4 0 declared that a sexually offensive
working environment violated Title VII and established guidelines on sexual
harassment claims.'"' The EEOC is the administrative agency which Congress
established to enforce Title VII."' 2 Although courts do not have to follow the
EEOC's position on a particular area of discrimination law, 4 3 most courts
respect the EEOC guidelines as the product of professional research and often
use the guidelines as an aid in deciding discrimination cases.'" Under the EEOC
guidelines, courts should determine whether harassment creates an offensive
working environment from the facts on a case by case basis. 45 In both condi-
tion of work and quidpro quo claims, the EEOC guidelines advocate holding
an employer strictly liable if supervisory or upper level personnel participated
in the harassment of an employee.' 6 If only co-workers participated in the
139. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text (Katz decision failed to reconcile dif-
ferences between Bundy and Henson decisions).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 to e-5 (1976 & Supp. V). The EEOC has the authority to enforce
provisions of Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(a). Pursuant to the power to enforce Title VII, the EEOC
may research and publish methods of effectuating congressional purposes for Title VII. Id. §
2000e-4(g)(5). Before an employee can bring suit under Title VII, the employee must file a Title
VII charge with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice. Id.
§ 2000e-5(e). Within 10 days after the employee files charges with the EEOC, the EEOC must
give notice of the charge to the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(b). After the EEOC investigates the
employee's charge to determine whether reasonable cause exists to believe the charge is true,
the EEOC undertakes to eliminate the unlawful employment practice through negotiation and
persuasion. Id. If after 180 days the negotiations are unsuccessful and the EEOC has not filed
an action against the employer, the EEOC gives the employee a notice to sue which allows the
employee 90 days time to bring suit against the employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1). See generally 2
A. L~AsoN & L. LAPsoN, supra note 12, §§ 48.0048.80 (EEOC procedures under Title VII).
141. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1983).
See generally Development, New EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex: Employer
Liability for Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 61 B.U. L. REv. 535 (1981) (discussing EEOC
guidelines and Title VII principles).
142. See supra note 140 (discussion of EEOC's powers and procedures).
143. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976) (Court stated that EEOC
rulings and guidelines are not controlling upon courts). Instead of the power to control the courts,
the Supreme Court in General Electric stated that the EEOC has the power to persuade the courts
through thorough research and valid reasoning. Id. at 142.
144. See Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F. Supp. 1309, 1315 (D.N.D. 1981) (court considering
sexual harassment claims gave great deference to EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment); Caldwell
v. Hodgeman, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1647, 1649 (D. Mass. 1981) (court used EEOC
guidelines in deciding sexual harassment issue under Massachusetts law); supra note 143 (EEOC
guidelines may persuade rather than control courts).
145. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (Commissioner will look at totality of circumstances in deter-
mining what conduct constitutes sexual harassment).
146. Id. at § 1604.11(c). Like the EEOC guidelines, the dissent in Henson called for strict
liability of employers if supervisors harassed employees. See 682 F.2d at 913-14 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(Henson dissent stated that employer should be strictly liable for supervisor's harassment of employee
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harassment, then the guidelines require evidence that the employer knew or
should have known of the harassment in order to hold the employer liable.'4 7
The EEOC guidelines, however, allow an employer to avoid liability for harass-
ment among co-workers if the employer demonstrates that the employer acted
effectively to end the harassment. 48 In advocating employer liability for both
condition of work and quidpro quo harassment claims, the EEOC guidelines
reflect the EEOC's policy of preventing discrimination through sexual harass-
ment in all areas of employment.'4 9
By holding that a sexually offensive work environment violated Title VII,
the Katz court furthered the EEOC's policies favoring the abolition of sexual
harassment. 5 Accordingly, the Katz court's test for employer liability in con-
dition of work claims reflects the EEOC position that employers should be
liable for creating a sexually offensive work environment for employees.'
Like the EEOC, the Katz court viewed an employer's knowledge as essential
to the employer's liability for the harassment. 15 2 Furthermore, the Katz court
would permit an employer to avoid liability for sexual harassment by showing
measures that the employer took to prevent the harassment. II Although the
Katz court did not follow the EEOC's position that courts should hold
employer's strictly liable if supervisory personnel participated in the harass-
ment, the Katz court imposed an especially heavy burden on the employer
to avoid liability if supervisors harassed employees."' Since Katz held that
employers are in violation of Title VII if the employer knew of sexual harass-
ment at the workplace and yet allowed the harassment to continue, the Katz
opinion is consistent with the EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment.' 5 The
because employer delegated responsibility of maintaining non-offensive work environment to
supervisor).
147. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d).
148. Id.
149. See id. at § 1604.11(f) (prevention is best method for ending sexual harassment); see
also Bundy, 641 F.2d at 947 (general goal of EEOC guidelines is prevention of harassment).
150. See 709 F.2d at 254-55 (Katz court's recognition of condition of work claims reflects
EEOC guidelines on sexual harassment); supra note 149 and accompanying text (EEOC guidelines
express EEOC policy of preventing sexual harassment).
151. See infra note 152 and accompanying text (Katz opinion and EEOC guidelines both
consider employer's knowledge of harassment as major factor in employer's liability for harassment).
152. 709 F.2d at 255-56; compare supra note 52 and accompanying text (under Katz test
for respondeat superior plaintiff must show that employer knew or should have known of harass-
ment) with supra text accompanying note 147 (under EEOC guidelines employer is liable for
harassment among co-workers if employer knew or should have known of harassment).
153. 709 F.2d at 256; compare supra note 54 and accompanying text (under Katz allocation
of proof scheme employer can rebut plaintiff's respondeat superior showing by indicating remedial
action employer took to end harassment) with supra text accompanying note 148 (under EEOC
guidelines employer can avoid liability for harassment among co-workers by indicating remedial
action that employer took to stop harassment).
154. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (employer's burden to rebut plaintiff's
respondeat superior showing under Katz allocation of proof scheme).
155. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (EEOC guidelines advocate employer liabil-
ity for sexual harassment not affecting tangible job benefits).
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Katz decision, therefore, furthers the EEOC policy of ending all types and
forms of sexual harassment at the workplace by expanding Title VII to cover
condition of work claims.'
56
Although the Katz holding parallels the EEOC's position on sexual harass-
ment, the Katz holding does not establish a clear standard for proving sexual
harassment claims.' For example, the court did not clarify the weight of
the evidentiary burden that shifts from party to party, but instead defined
the burdens in very general terms.' Although the court explained that the
employer's burden to rebut the plaintiff's respondeat superior showing may
be especially heavy if supervisory personnel participated in the harassment
of employees, the court apparently contradicted this explanation in a foot-
note stating that the ultimate burden of proving intent to discriminate always
remains with the plaintiff.'" The footnote is additionally confusing because
the court previously had declared that intent to discriminate was not an issue
in condition of work claims.' 60 Since the Katz court did not discuss specifical-
ly the evidentiary burdens in the allocation of proof scheme, the new Katz
decision may be a source of confusion to courts trying condition of work
claims. 6'
By holding that sexual harassment which created an offensive working
environment violated Title VII, the Katz case is consistent with both the EEOC
guidelines on sexual harassment and the general trend in the law recognizing
condition of work claims.'6 2 The Katz court, however, failed to settle confu-
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (policy behind EEOC guidelines is preven-
tion of sexual harassment at workplace).
157. See infra note 158 and accompanying text (Katz court unclear about burden of proof
in Katz allocation of proof scheme).
158. See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text (Katz court's allocation of proof scheme
for condition of work claims). The Katz court stated that the plaintiff makes a primafacie case
of a condition of work claim by "showing" that sexually harassing actions occurred. 709 F.2d
at 256. The court described the employer's rebuttal burden in terms of the employer directly
"proving" that the plaintiff was wrong or indirectly "showing" or "pointing to" circumstances
which would release the employer from liability. See id.; cf. Allocations of Burdens of Proof,
supra note 15, at 646 (Supreme Court's choice of imprecise terms to define weight of shifting
evidentiary burdens in Title VII cases created confusion in circuit courts over trying Title VII claims).
159. Compare 709 F.2d at 256 (Katz court stated that employer's rebuttal burden on respondeat
superior is especially heavy if supervisors were party to or privy to harassment) with id. at 256
n.7 (under Katz allocation of proof scheme for condition of work claims plaintiff always bears
ultimate burden of persuasion).
160. Compare 709 F.2d at 255 (Katz court determined that issue of respondeat superior replaces
issue of intent to discriminate in condition of work claims) with id. at 256 n.7 (Katz court deter-
mined that plaintiff always bears ultimate burden of persuasion to prove intentional nature of
harassment).
161. Cf. Allocations of Burdens of Proof, supra note 15, at 646 (Supreme Court's choice
of imprecise terms to define weight of shifting burdens in Title VII cases created confusion in
circuit courts over trying Title VII claims).
162. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (EEOC Guidelines declare sexually offensive
working environment violates Title VII); supra note 3 and accompanying text (courts recently
have held that sexually offensive work environment violates Title VII); see also 709 F.2d at 255
(Katz court held sexually offensive work environment violated Title VII).
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sion in the courts concerning sexual harassment claims.' 63 The Fourth Circuit
established a shifting allocation of proof scheme for condition of work claims,
even though the court recognized that the question of intent which necessitates
a shifting allocation of proof scheme in disparate treatment cases is absent
in condition of work claims.' 61 In creating the allocation of proof scheme,
the Katz court did not address the Henson court's reasoning that special proof
schemes are unnecessary in condition of work claims given the absence of
any difficult intent to discriminate issue. 165 Although the Fourth Circuit im-
plicitly followed part of the Henson decision by separating the condition of
work and disparate treatment claims, the Katz court did not discuss either
the Henson court's decision to separate the two claims or the Bundy court's
decision to allow proof of a condition of work claim to affect resolution of
a quid pro quo claim. 66 Furthermore, in establishing the allocation of proof
scheme for condition of work claims, the Katz court did not define adequately
the weight of the burdens of proof which shift from party to party under
the new allocation of proof scheme.' 67 Consequently, Katz merely adds a new
method of proof to the area of sexual harassment claims that does not settle
the conflicts among courts over sexual harassment claims.' 68
JOHN CALHOUN MORROW
C. Standards of Statistical Significance in Employment Discrimination
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' to prohibit
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
163. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text (Katz court established third standard
for condition of work claims without addressing differences in Bundy and Henson decisions).
164. See supra notes 159-60 and accompanying text (Katz court designed shifting allocation
of proof scheme for condition of work claims although no difficult intent to discriminate ques-
tion was at issue).
165. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (Katz court failed to consider Henson court's
ruling that special allocation of proof schemes are unnecessary in condition of work claims).
166. See supra notes 136-37 and accompanying text (Katz court separated Katz's condition
of work and quidpro quo claims without addressing Bundy court's decision combining two claims
or Henson court's decision to keep two claims separate).
167. See supra notes 158-59 and accompanying text (Katz court defined weight of eviden-
tiary burden which shifts from party to party in condition of work claims in very general terms).
168. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (Katz decision adds new standard for prov-
ing claims to areas of sexual harassment law without settling confusion among courts over how
to prove sexual harassment claims).
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 302-17 (codified
as amended at 1) 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). Section 703 of Title VII makes it an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any individual with respect to the
individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's
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national origin.' In Title VII cases, litigants often rely on statistical evidence
to either establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination
3 or to rebut
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Section 703 of Title
VII also prohibits an employer from limiting, segregating, or classifying employees or applicants
for employment in any way that would adversely affect the individual's employee status because
of the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. Title VII's primary goal is
to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the
past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. See Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (Title VII's goal is to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunity). Congress enacted Title VII to remove artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to
employment when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race or other
impermissible classifications. Id. at 431.
Title VII should be liberally interpreted since the Act tolerates no discrimination, subtle or
otherwise. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (overriding interest
in fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions). While Title VII deserves a liberal
interpretation, Title VII does not guarantee every person a job regardless of qualifications. See
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (Title VII does not command that any person be hired simply because
person was formerly subject to discrimination or because person is member of minority group).
By enacting Title VII, Congress only proscribed discriminatory preference for any group, minority
or majority. See id. at 431.
2. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982) (prohibiting discrimination in hiring, discharge, com-
pensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment).
3. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (order and allocation
of proof in disparate treatment case). But see EEOC v. Western Electric Co., 32 Empl. Prac.
Dec. (CCH) 33,759, at 30,657, 30,663 (4th Cir. July 26, 1983) (plaintiffs' reliance on statistical
data insufficient to establish prima facie case). Courts recognize two types of employment discrimina-
tion cases. See 411 U.S. at 802 (recognizing disparate treatment theory of discrimination); Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (recognizing disparate impact theory of discrimina-
tion); see also International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (plaintiff may sue on disparate impact or disparate treatment theories of discrimination).
A plaintiff in a disparate treatment case must show that an employer treated plaintiff employee
less favorably because of the employee's membership in a protected group. See 411 U.S. at 805.
To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in an individual disparate treat-
ment case, a plaintiff must prove that plaintiff belonged to a protected group, that plaintiff ap-
plied and was qualified for a job for which an employer sought applicants, that the employer
rejected plaintiff's application despite plaintiff's qualifications, and that the position remained
open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifications
after plaintiff's rejection. Id. at 802.
The disparate treatment theory requires that a plaintiff prove an employer's discriminatory
intent. See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24, 26-27 (1978) (per
curiam) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discriminatory intent required in disparate treatment cases);
Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (discriminatory motive critical in disparate treatment actions).
In a disparate impact case, however, a plaintiff must prove that a facially neutral employment
practice has a substantially discriminatory impact on a protected group. See Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 433 U.S. 321, 328-30 (1977) (facially neutral standards selected applicants for hire in significantly
discriminatory pattern); Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (neutral employ-
ment practices selected applicants in racial pattern significantly different from pool of applicants)
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430 (practices, procedures, or tests neutral on face but discriminatory in
operation). The key difference between the disparate impact and disparate treatment theories
of discrimination concerns the employer's intent. Compare McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S.
at 805-06 (proof of employer's discriminatory intent required in disparate treatment case) with
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-33 (proof of employer's discriminatory motive irrelevant in disparate
impact action).
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a prima facie case of discrimination.4 In employment discrimination cases,
contestants present the court with statistical studies comparing the number
of persons in a protected group that a contestant would expect the employer
to hire or promote in a race or sex neutral environment, with the number
of persons in the protected group actually hired or promoted.' For example,
if ten black employees were expected to be promoted and the employer actually
promoted only five black employees, the statistical comparison would be ten
compared to five.6 To determine whether a disparity between actual and ex-
pected employment practices constitutes a Title VII violation, a court must
determine how statistically significant7 the disparity between the expected result
and the observed result must be before the court can assume that the disparity
resulted from discrimination rather than from random chance.'
4. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-56 (1981). In
Burdine, the Supreme Court held that to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination
a defendant must only articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for engaging in a
discriminatory employment practice. Id. The Burdine Court stated that to rebut a plaintiff's prima
facie case a defendant's burden of proof is a burden of production, not persuasion. Id. The
burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff to prove discrimination. Id.
5. See B. ScHIEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION LAW 1370 (1983). The
end result of the process of statistical proof presents the court with the expected number of per-
sons in the protected group hired or promoted in a race- or sex-neutral environment compared
to the actual number of persons in the protected group hired or promoted. Id. at 1370 n.325.
6. Id.
7. See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 647 n.17 (4th Cir.)
(in employment discrimination context level of significance identifies probability that observed
cause-effect relationship occurred by chance), cert. granted sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond, 52 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1983) (No. 83-185).
8. See B. ScimI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1371-75. A court may apply one of
three possible tests for statistical significance. Id. The three tests of statistical significance include
the .05 level of statistical significance, the Hazelwood two or three standard deviations test, or
the four-fifths rule of the government's Uniform Selection Guidelines. Id. at 1372. The .05 level
of statistical significance is a convention adopted from social science which signifies that the
probability of a disparity occurring by chance is 5% or one out of twenty. Id. Several courts
apply the .05 level of statistical significance in discrimination cases. See Albermarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430, 437 (1975) (citing testimony of statisticians analyzing disparity
between black and white pass/fail rates on a standardized test using .05 level of statistical
significance); Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 505 F. Supp. 224, 384-85 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (referring
to customary and traditional 5% level of statistical significance); see also D. BALDUS & J. COLE,
STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCRIMINATION 308 n.36 (1980 & Supp. 1983) (social scientists generally
use .05 level of significance and .05 level of significance accepted by many courts). A number
of commentators have recommended -that courts require the .05 level of statistical significance
in employment discrimination cases. See Hallock, The Numbers Game-The Use and Misuse
of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VIL. L. REv. 5, 13 (1977); Note, Beyond the Prima
Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law: Statistical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 387, 400-01 n. 58 (1975).
The Supreme Court applied a two or three standard deviations test to an employment
discrimination case in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States. See Hazelwood, 433 U.S. 299,
309-11 nn. 14 & 17 (1977) (disparity greater than two or three standard deviations proof of
discrimination in teacher hiring); see also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n. 17 (1977)
(in jury selection process standard deviations of more than two or three from expected number
of minority jurors to actual number of minority jurors would be suspect to social scientist). Although
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A majority of courts apply standard deviation analysis to determine
whether a disparity between an expected result and an observed result is
statistically significant.9 A standard deviation is a measure of the variation
from an expected to an observed number. 0 The likelihood that chance caused
a difference between an expected outcome and an observed outcome decreases
as the number of standard deviations increases. " For example, a standard
deviation of two indicates a 4.6 percent likelihood that an observed outcome
occurred by chance and a standard deviation of three indicates a .3 percent
likelihood that an observed outcome occurred by chance.2 In Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States,'3 the Supreme Court held that a disparity be-
tween the expected number of employees and the actual number of employees
greater than two or three standard deviations decreases the probability that
the Hazelvood Court did not hold that all courts must apply the two or three standard deviations
test in employment discrimination cases, most courts have applied the two or three standard devia-
tions test to assess statistical significance. See Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment Serv.,
699 F.2d 760, 768 n.9 (5th Cir.)(standard deviation applied in employment referral case), reh'g
en banc denied, 705 F.2d 450 (1983); Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982)
(Fourth Circuit courts must apply standard deviation analysis in all racial discrimination cases);
Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local 396,
637 F.2d 506, 513-14 (8th Cir. 1980) (standard deviations of two or three are statistically signifi-
cant); Board of Education of N.Y. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 584 n.29 (2d Cir. 1978) (standard
deviation measures significance of statistical disparities).
The employee selection procedures in the Uniform Guidelines provide a framework for deter-
mining the proper use of tests and other selection procedures in employment practices. See 29
C.F.R. § 1607.1(B) (1983). The Uniform Guidelines state that federal law will presume adverse
impact if the selection rate for the protected group is less than 4/5 or 80% of the selection rate
for the favored group. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1983). The Uniform Guidelines' 4/5 rule,
however, has received mixed acceptance by the courts. Compare Moore v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 232, 234 (E.D. Tex. 1978) (4/5 rule adopted as stan-
dard for determining adverse impact in pass/fail comparison), aff'd per curiam, 593 -.2d 607
(5th Cir. 1979) with Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers, Local 102, 498 F. Supp. 952, 966 (D.D.C.
1980) (4/5 rule is arbitrary standard), aff'd, 25 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 837 (D.C. Cir.
1981). One commentator sharply criticized the Uniform Guidelines 4/5 rule for failing to con-
sider differences in sampling size. See Shoben, Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing:
Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARv. L. REV. 793, 805-11 (1978) (4/5 rule compares only
ratios and does not account for differences in sample size and magnitude of differences in pass rates).
9. See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1371 (courts must decide what test
of statistical significance to use).
10. See D. BARNES, STATISTICS AS PROOF: FUNDAMENTALS OF QUANTITATIVE EVIDENCE 80
(1983) (standard deviation quantifies disparity between expected and actual number); see also
R. ELLIS, STATISTICAL INFERENCE: BASIC CONCEPTS 51 (1975) (standard deviation indicates relative
frequencies of different occurrences as a direct indication of probability of occurring); H.
HARTKEMEIER, INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 134-35 (1968) (standard devia-
tion is measure of variation from expected to observed number).
11. See H. HARTKEMEIER, supra note 10, at 135 (larger standard deviation becomes greater
amount of variation).
12. See D. BARNES, supra note 10, at 140-41. Whenever a sample is expected to be normally
distributed around the mean, 68% of the observations will be within one standard deviation of
the mean, 95.4% of all observations will be within two standard deviations of the mean, and
99.7% of all observations will be within three standard deviations of the mean. Id. at 140.
13. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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the observed result occurred by chance.14 Standard deviation analysis, therefore,
quantifies the likelihood that chance caused a difference between an expected
result and an observed result. 15
To calculate standard deviations, courts have applied either the
hypergeometric distribution test or the binomial distribution formula.' 6 The
hypergeometric distribution test is a test of statistical significance that statisti-
cians apply to small samples.' 7 The hypergeometric distribution test assumes
that a sample population is finite and that each selection from that pool is
not replaced in the pool once selected.'S In contrast to the hypergeometric
distribution test, the binomial distribution test is a test of statistical significance
that statisticians apply to samples exceeding thirty in number. '9 The binomial
distribution test applies to a sample population that has only two observed
values.2" The binomial distribution, therefore, quantifies the probability that
14. See id. at 306-18. In Hazelwood, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue
of statistical significance in an employment discrimination context. Id. The Hazelwood Court
examined the disparity between the actual number of black teachers on the Hazelwood teaching
staff and the expected number of black teachers on the school district's staff. Id. at 308-09 n.14.
The Court noted that the Court had explained in Castaneda v. Partida a precise method of measuring
the significance of statistical disparities. Id.; see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-97 n.17
(1977) (standard deviation analysis used to obtain statistical significance). The Hazelwood Court
stated that standard deviation analysis, as used in Castaneda, provided a measure of statistical
significance by calculating predicted fluctuations from the expected value of a sample. 433 U.S.
at 308-09 n.14. The Hazelwood Court further stated that disparities between an expected value
and an observed value greater than two or three standard deviations would be statistically signifi-
cant. Id.; see EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1191-92 (4th Cir. 1981) (standard
deviations greater than two or three necessarily exclude chance as a cause of underrepresenta-
tion), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 103 S. Ct. 235 (1982). The American Natl Bank court con-
cluded that courts should be extremely cautious in drawing any conclusions from standard devia-
tions in the range of one to three. Id. at 1192. The American Nat'l Bank court held that within
the range of one to three standard deviations, a contestant must provide additional evidence to
prove or rebut a finding of discrimination. Id. at 1192-93; see Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078,
1082 (4th Cir. 1982) (standard deviation analysis mandated in all Fourth Circuit racial discrimination
cases). In Moultrie, the Fourth Circuit explicitly held that district courts must apply standard
deviation analysis to all racial discrimination cases to promulgate standard mathematical pro-
cedures in Fourth Circuit decisions. 690 F.2d at 1082.
15. See supra note 10 (definition of standard deviation).
16. Compare Brown v. Delta Air Lines, 522 F. Supp. 1218, 1228-29 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (ap-
plying hypergeometric test) with Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 309
n.17 (1977) (applying binomial distribution test).
17. See EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633, 650 (4th Cir.)
(hypergeometric distribution formula appropriate when small numbers are involved that are finite
and without replacements), cert. granted sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, 52 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1983) (No. 83-185).
18. See R. WnKLER & W. HAYS, STATISTICS: PROBABrTrrY, INFERENCE, AND DECSlION, 225
(2d ed. 1975) (hypergeometric test used on small, finite sample populations); P. HOEL & R. JasSaN,
BASIC STATISTICS FOR BusINEss AND ECONOMICS, 132-33 (2d ed. 1977) (specifying circumstances
where hypergeometric test appropriate); P. HoEL, INTRODUCTION TO MATHEMATICAL STATISTICS,
67-68 (4th ed. 1971) (stating when hypergeometric tests correct).
19. See D. BALDUs & J. COLE, supra note 8, 1982 Supp. at 82 (binomial test proper when
sample at least 30 or more).
20. See D. BARNES, supra note 10, at 70 (binomial distribution used where only two possi-
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an employer will select a protected group member and the probability that
the employer will select a non-protected group member.2 '
In EEOC v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,22 the Fourth Circuit re-
affirmed the use of standard deviation analysis to obtain statistical significance
and" held that lower courts must apply the binomial distribution formula to
calculate standard deviation in Title VII cases. "3 In Federal Reserve Bank,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and four
intervenors24 instituted a class action " suit in the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina alleging that the Federal Reserve
Bank of Richmond (Bank) 26 engaged in racially discriminatory practices and
policies by failing to promote black employees to higher pay grade job
classifications 27 At trial, plaintiffs presented statistical evidence to prove that
ble outcomes). See D. BARNEs, supra note 10, at 82. For a binomial distribution, the standard
deviation equals the square root of the total population sample multiplied by the percentage of
persons in the protected group (i.e. blacks) multiplied by the percentage of persons not in the
protected group (i.e. non-blacks). Id.; see EEOC v. Federal Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633,
650-52 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 52
U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1983) (No. 83-185). A binomial distribution represents an either-or
situation. Id. In racial discrimination cases, a binomial distribution indicates the probability of
either selecting a minority member or the probability of choosing a non-minority member from
a sample population. Id.; see D. B~AEs, supra note 10, at 70 (binomial distribution used to
establish probability of event occurring when only two outcomes are possible).
21. See supra note 20 (binomial distribution formula quantifies probability of selecting either
X or non-X).
22. 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, 52 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1983) (No. 83-185).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 637. In Federal Reserve Bank, four intervenors, Moore, Hannah, Cooper,
and Russell represented both former and present employees of the Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond, Charlotte, North Carolina branch. Id. The District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina denied the individual claims of intervenors, Moore and Elmore Hannah because neither
Moore nor Hannah proved that they suffered any discrimination because of their race. Id. at
638. The district court held that the bank had discriminated against intervenor Sylvia Cooper
by failing to promote Cooper from a job as a settlement clerk to a position as utility supervisor.
Id. at 637-38. The district court also held that the bank discriminated against intervenor Con-
stance Russell by failing to promote Russell to a utility clerk position from a position as a utility
operator and by retaliatorily discharging Russell in response to Russell's filing of discrimination
charges with the EEOC. Id. at 638. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit remanded Cooper's claim
to the district court with directions to dismiss and reversed Russell's claim. Id. at 664-73.
The Supreme Court has recently granted review in Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank of Rich-
mond. See 52 U.S.L.W. 3330 (U.S. Nov. 1, 1983) (No. 83-185). The question presented for review
is whether the Fourth Circuit erred in holding that a prior finding that any pattern or practice
of employment discrimination was not pervasive precluded as res judicata all employees from
litigating individual claims of discrimination. Id.
25. 698 F.2d at 637. The district court in Federal Reserve Bank certified intervenors as
representatives of all black persons that worked for the defendant after January 3, 1974. Id.
26. See id. The action in Federal Reserve Bank involved only the Charlotte branch of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Id.
27. Id. The district court in Federal Reserve Bank held that the bank discriminated against
black employees in pay grades four and five only. Id. at 638. The bank classified employees
from pay grade three to pay grade sixteen. Id. at 637. The district court held that the bank did
not engage in discrimination in any of the twelve other job rating levels. Id. at 638.
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the Bank failed to grant black employees promotion opportunities similar to
promotion opportunities that the Bank granted white employees. "8 After
examining two statistical tables comparing the number of expected black pro-
motions with the number of actual black promotions, the district court held
that plaintiffs established that the bank discriminated against blacks by fail-
ing to promote blacks out of pay grades four and five into higher pay grade
levels.29 The Bank appealed the district court's judgment to the Fourth Circuit."
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit recognized two problems with the numbers
plaintiffs used in the two statistical tables plaintiffs submitted to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination.31 First, the Federal Reserve Bank court
observed that the plaintiffs computed the number of employees in each pay
grade for any year of the 1974-1978 period by counting only the persons
employed in the pay grade for the entire year 2.3 The court noted that plain-
tiff's method of calculating employee numbers by not counting employees who
resigned, terminated, or were promoted from a pay grade prior to year end
increased the percentage of black employees eligible for promotion. Plain-
tiffs' method of calculation increased the expected number of black promo-
tions over what the number would have been if plaintiffs used either the number
of employees at the beginning of the year, or the number at the end of the
year, or an average of the two. 33 Second, the court objected to plaintiffs'
28. See id. at 648-62.
29. See id. at 638. The district court in Federal Reserve Bank, held that the bank engaged
in a pattern and practice of discrimination from 1974 to 1978 by failing to grant black employees
promotion opportunities similar to opportunities offered to white employees in pay grades 4 and
5. Id. In Federal Reserve Bank the district court relied on the statistical tables as submitted in
testimony by plaintiffs' expert to find statistically significant disparity in promotions of black
employees in pay grades four and five. Id. at 648.
A plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination by statistics alone. See Teamsters
v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977) (Supreme Court rejected employer's argument that
statistics alone can never establish a prima facie case of discrimination); see also EEOC v. American
Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1188 (4th Cir. 1981) (prima facie case established by statistics alone
or by cumulation of evidence including statistics, patterns, practices, general policies, or specific
instances of discrimination).
An employer may rebut a plaintiff's prima fade case of discrimination by demonstrating
that plaintiff's proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. See Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324, 360 (1977) (employer may dispel inference of discrimination by providing own statistical
evidence); see also EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1188 (4th Cir. 1981) (employer
may prove plaintiff's statistics insignificant by proving that disparities result from pre-Title VII
rather than from post-Title VII employment practices).
30. See 698 F.2d at 660-62.
31. See id. at 648-62. The Federal Reserve Bank court noted that the district court relied
on two statistical tables submitted by plaintiffs' expert purporting to show for the years 1974-1978
the number of employees in pay grades four and five, the percentage of black employees in pay
grades four and five, the number of promotions in each year in pay grades four and five, the
number of black promotees in pay grades four and five, the expected number of black promotees
if black promotions had coincided with the black percentageof the total number of employees
in pay grades four and five, and the difference between the expected and actual number of black
promotions in pay grades four and five. Id. at 648.
32. Id. at 648-49.
33. Id. at 649. The Federal Reserve Bank court noted that plaintiffs' calculation of the
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manner of calculating the number of black promotions. 4 The court stated
that plaintiffs underrepresented the number of black promotions for each year
by failing to include black promotees who left the Bank prior to year end. 3s
Moreover, the court noted that plaintiffs presented no rational basis for under-
representing the actual number of black promotions.36 The Federal Reserve
Bank court concluded that plaintiffs' reliance on untrustworthy data to calculate
standard deviations between the expected and actual number of black promo-
tions rendered plaintiffs' statistical tables inaccurate and misleading. 37
The Fourth Circuit next examined plaintiffs' method of calculating the
standard deviations between the expected and actual numbers demonstrated
by plaintiffs' two statistical tables. 38 The plaintiffs used a hypergeometric
distribution test to calculate standard deviations 9. 3 The Federal Reserve Bank
court, however, rejected plaintiffs' use of a hypergeometric test because plain-
tiffs' samples exceeded thirty in number.40 The court also rejected plaintiffs'
hypergeometric test because the sample represented a pool of eligibles from
which the Bank replaced employees receiving promotions or terminations.,'
The Federal Reserve Bank court held that the Bank's presumed replenishing
of the pool of employees eligible for promotion made the binomial distribu-
tion test instead of the hypergeometric test appropriate because the replaced
sampling model applied."' Furthermore, even under plaintiffs' hypergeometric
formula, the court discovered that the plaintiffs' computation of standard
employee total which did not consider employee attrition during the test year, resulted in in-
accurate totals for the percentage of black employees, particularly in pay grade four. Id. Although
the Fourth Circuit did not clarify this conclusion, the court presumably found that more whites
than blacks left the pay grades during the course of any one of the test years. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The Fourth Circuit in Federal Reserve Bank noted that the actual number of black
promotions in pay grade four for the years 1974-77 totaled 39. Id. The court, however, observed
that plaintiffs' statistical tables revealed only 35 black promotions in pay grade four for the years
1974-77. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' method of reducing the number of
black promotions in pay grade four increased the disparity between the expected number of black
promotions and the observed number of black promotions. Id. at 649-50. The court held that
since plaintiffs used artificial numbers to calculate statistically significant standard deviations,
such disparities should not be given the full weight of authority. Id. at 649-50.
36. Id. at 649. The Fourth Circuit in Federal Reserve Bank stated that the court could
find no rational basis for plaintiffs' use of an inaccurate figure for black promotions unless plaintiffs
wanted to obtain a standard deviation greater than -2. Id.
37. Id. at 650.
38. Id. at 650-54.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 650. The Federal Reserve Bank court noted that in pay grade four the sample
population totaled 154 and in pay grade five the sample population totaled 269. Id. The sample
size in both pay grades four and five, therefore, required the use of a binomial distribution for-
mula. Id.
41. Id. at 650-51. The Fourth Circuit observed that a binomial distribution test should apply
to plaintiffs' statistical tables since plaintiffs' population sample represented a pool of employees
from which employees promoted to higher pay grades or terminated from employment subse-
quently were replaced by new employees. Id.
42. Id.
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deviations in pay grade five was inaccurate.43 Using the hypergeometric for-
mula, the court calculated a standard deviation of -1.87 in pay grade five com-
pared to plaintiffs' calculation of a standard deviation of -2.01 in pay grade
five." Moreover, when the court applied the binomial distribution test to pay
grades four and five, the court calculated a standard deviation of -2.07 for
pay grade four and a standard deviation of -1.45 for pay grade five.4 5 Based
on the court's new calculations using the binomial test, the Fourth Circuit
found neither standard deviation statistically significant under the Hazelwood
two or three standard deviations test since the deviation for pay grade four
was marginally over -2 and the deviation for pay grade five was well below -2.46
The Federal Reserve Bank court then examined plaintiffs' study matching
black and white employees with similar characteristics including lengths of
service, pay grades, educational levels, departments, and lengths of service
in pay grades.41 The purpose of a matching study is to indicate discrimination
against blacks in promotions. 41 The court, however, objected to plaintiffs'
study because the number of matches represented only a small percentage of
the total workforce, and because plaintiffs did not confine the study to pay
grades four and five.49 The Fourth Circuit concluded that acceptance of plain-
tiffs' study, which indicated discrimination at all levels of employment, would
contradict the district court's finding of discrimination only in pay grades four
and five.5 0 The court, however, did not examine the study's reliability since
plaintiffs' expert admitted that the study revealed a standard deviation of -1.79,
well below the two or three standard deviations test set forth by the Hazelwood
Court for statistical significance. 5'
The Fourth Circuit next observed that plaintiffs' expert reviewed the
statistical evidence with a presumption of discrimination. 2 Plaintiffs' expert
43. Id. at 651.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Fourth Circuit held that even though the standard deviation in pay grade four
exceeded -2, the disparity in pay grade four was legally insignificant because plaintiffs' expert
did not use the correct number of actual black promotions in calculating the standard deviation
between the number of actual black promotions to the expected number of black promotions.
Id.; see Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 311 n.17 (1977) (two or three
standard deviations minimum for legal significance); see also supra note 8 (discussion of Hazelwood
two or three standard deviations test).





52. Id. at 652-53. The Fourth Circuit in Federal Reserve Bank examined the testimony of
plaintiffs' expert to determine whether the evidence entitled plaintiffs to conduct a statistical analysis
of the Bank's promotion practices with a presumption of discrimination. Id. Plaintiffs' expert
testified that plaintiffs' statistics assumed significance only with a reasonable belief that an employer
discriminated against black employees. Id. The Fourth Circuit rejected plaintiffs' presumption
of discrimination since such an assumption arbitrarily favors plaintiffs in discrimination cases.
Id. The court concluded that a presumption that favors one party over another party could not
provide a reliable basis for a finding of discrimination. Id. at 653.
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used a one-tailed test to obtain statistical significance.5 3 A one-tailed test of
statistical significance examines the question how often a observer would see
a disparity favoring only white employees in the absence of discrimination."'
In contrast to the one-tailed test, a two-tailed test of statistical significance
inquires how often an observer would see a disparity favoring either black
or white employees in the absence of discrimination.-- In practical terms, the
difference between a one-tailed and a two-tailed test is that the level of statistical
significance produced by a two-tailed test is generally twice the level of statistical
significance produced by a one-tailed test.5 6 For example, using a one-tailed
test of statistical significance, a value of 1.64 standard deviations corresponds
to about two standard deviations when using a two-tailed test.5 Using a one-
tailed test to obtain statistical significance, a contestant could reach the two
standard deviations threshold of the Hazelwood two or three standard devia-
tions rule by demonstrating a standard deviation of only 1.64.58 The Federal
Reserve Bank court held that to justify use of the one-tailed test of statistical
significance, a plaintiff must produce independent evidence supporting a belief
or assumption of discrimination. 9
In Federal Reserve Bank, plaintiffs' expert relied on multiple regression
studies to provide the necessary inference of discrimination.6 Multiple regres-
sion analysis assigns numerical weights to certain independent variables (e.g.,
age, race, sex) in relation to a single dependent variable (e.g., promotions). 6'
53. Id. at 655-56.
54. Id.; see D. BALDUs & J. CoLE, supra note 8, at 307-08 (defining one-tailed test of statistical
significance). A one-tailed test of statistical significance addresses the question of how often an
observer would see a disparity that favored only white employees in a race-neutral environment. Id.
55. See 698 F.2d at 655-56. A two-tailed test of statistical significance addresses the ques-
tion, if given a race-neutral environment, how frequently would an observer see a disparity that
favored either black or white employees. See D. BALDUs & J. COLE, supra note 8, at 307-08
(two-tailed test used to demonstrate probability of selecting either a white or a black).
56. See D. BALDus & J. CorE, supra note 8, at 307 (two-tailed test produces level of statistical
significance twice size of level of significance one-tailed test produces).
57. See 698 F.2d at 655.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 656 (must start with assumption of discrimination based on independent evidence
to apply one-tailed test).
60. Id. at 656-60.
61. See Schoeman, Understanding the Role of Statistical Evidence in Equal Employment
Opportunity Law, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 136, 139 (April 1982) (multiple regression analysis weighs
relative importance of possible causes of observed result). Multiple regression analysis is a statistical
method for summarizing the independent effects of numerous factors. Id. Multiple regression
analysis summarizes the degree that changes in the values of a number of variables correspond
to changes in the value of a single variable. Id. Multiple regression analysis has a wide applica-
tion. Id. Often, the value of a particular variable is due to changes in the values of more than
one other variable. Id. For example, salary may be determined not only by education but also
by seniority, experience, and a number of other factors. Id. When more than one variable is
used to explain the value of another variable, multiple regression may indicate how much in-
fluence each of a number of independent variables has on a dependent variable. Id.; see D. BAWDUs
& J. COLE, supra note 8, at 240-86 (multiple regression model can measure impact of one factor
while simultaneously adjusting for effect of several factors); B. ScmLE & P. GROSSiAN, supra
note 5, at 1342-46 (multiple regression analysis measures influence of independent variables on
dependent variable).
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Statisticians use multiple regression analysis to determine whether a particular
independent variable influenced a dependent variable.6 2 Plaintiffs' expert
prepared three multiple regression studies to justify a presumption of
discrimination in the bank's promotion practices.6 3 The first multiple regres-
sion study compared the salaries of blacks and whites in all pay grades and
showed that the Bank had a greater percentage of whites than blacks in the
upper pay grades." Plaintiffs' second multiple regression study demonstrated
both that the Bank assigned a larger percentage of blacks than whites to
cafeteria and cleaning jobs and that the Bank assigned a smaller percentage
of blacks than whites to pay grades six to fourteen."5 The third multiple regres-
sion study indicated that fifty-three percent of the Bank's black employees
as compared to twenty-six percent of the Bank's white employees worked in
pay grades six and below.
66
The Fourth Circuit held that plaintiffs' salary comparison, could not sup-
port a presumption of discrimination because the salary study compared the
bank officers to employees in the lowest pay grade treating all jobs as
interchangeable. 7 The court also held that plaintiffs' job assignment study
could not provide plaintiffs' expert with a basis for inferring discrimination
since the district court found no discrimination in job assignments. 6 The court
held that plaintiffs' study comparing the percentage of black employees to
the percentage of white employees in pay grades six and below could not justify
plaintiffs' presumption of discrimination because plaintiffs' study failed to
consider additional qualifications as a prerequisite to promotion to pay grades
above level six. 69 The Fourth Circuit then held that plaintiffs' use of a one-
tailed test was inappropriate. Plaintiffs failed to present sufficient indepen-
dent evidence of discrimination.
70
After a thorough examination of plaintiffs' statistical tables, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' statistical evidence failed to establish a prima
62. See B. Scm m & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 5, at 1342-46 (multiple regression analysis
explains effect of independent variables on dependent variable).
63. See 698 F.2d at 656-60.
64. Id. at 656-57.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 658.
67. Id. The Fourth Circuit in FederalReserve Bank noted that studies involving an overall
comparison of salaries which include employees at the lowest pay level and employees at the
highest pay level are unreliable since overall salary comparisons do not treat salary as a function
of job position and job qualifications. Id. at 657-58; see Agarwal v. Arthur McKee & Co., 19
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 503, 512 (N.D. Cal.) (all job positions do not require equal levels
of knowledge, skill, and responsibility), aff'd, 644 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1981).
68. See 698 F.2d at 658. In Federal Reserve Bank the Fourth Circuit noted that plaintiffs'
expert demonstrated that over 85% of the bank's housekeeping and food service workers either
had requested cleaning or cafeteria jobs or had prior work experience in cleaning or cafeteria
jobs. Id. The court, therefore, concluded that plaintiffs could not prove discrimination through
the job assignment study. Id.




facie case of discrimination in pay grades four and five.7' The Federal Reserve
Bank court held that the district court's finding of a pattern and practice of
discrimination was clearly erroneous and without substantial evidentiary sup-
port in the record. 72 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit dismissed plaintiffs' class
action claim.
73
The Fourth Circuit has subsequently affirmed the rule promulgated in
Federal Reserve Bank that courts must use a binomial distribution test when
calculating standard deviations in EEOC v. Western Electric Co., Inc. 74 In
Western Electric, plaintiff alleged that defendant, Western Electric Company,
engaged in age discrimination by demoting older workers during a reduction
in the number of workers." 5 Plaintiffs presented statistical evidence purporting
to show actual demotions at a level of approximately three standard devia-
tions from the expected number of demotions.76 The Western Electric court
noted that plaintiffs used a hypergeometric test of statistical significance to
obtain results more favorable to plaintiffs than findings that would result from
the use of a binomial distribution formula.77 The Western Electric court,
however, did not convert plaintiffs' statistics to a binomial equivalent since
the court held plaintiffs' studies insufficient to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination. 78 The court held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination because plaintiff did not account for the role of
job qualifications in Western Electric's procedure for selecting supervisors for
demotion. 9 On the basis of performance and expertise, the supervisors Western
Electric selected for demotion were less qualified than the supervisors Western
Electric retained.8" The Western Electric court's failure to examine the par-
71. See id. at 664.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. 32 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,759, at 30,657 (4th Cir. July 26, 1983).
75. Id. at 30,661-62.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 30,662. In Western Electric, the EEOC's statistical tables 99A and 100A calculated
the standard deviations between the expected and actual number of supervisors demoted for ages
50 and over during the period July 1, 1974, to July 1, 1976 using a binomial distribution test.
Id. Tables 99B and 100B, however, used a hypergeometric formula to calculate the number of
standard deviations. Id. Using a binomial formula, tables 99A and 100A revealed total standard
deviations of 4.8890 and 4.0327 respectively. Tables 99B and 100B, however, showed standard
deviations of 5.8830 and 4.7955 respectively using a hypergeometric formula. Id. at 30,664-67.
The Western Electric court, therefore, observed that plaintiff's tables using the hypergeometric
formula noticeably favored the plaintiff. Id. at 30,662.
78. Id. at 30,663. The Western Electric court noted that the EEOC failed to establish a
prima facie case of discrimination against supervisors between the ages of 40 to 65. Id. Under
the binomial test, plaintiffs' statistics for ages 50 to 65 demonstrated standard deviations of more
than three for only two areas in Western Electric's Southern Region. Id. Plaintiffs' hypergeometric
tables revealed standard deviations in excess of three for only three geographic areas within the
Southern Region. Id.
79. Id. The Western Electric court held that the trial court erred in finding that job qualifica-
tions did not play a role in Western Electric's demotion selection process. Id.
80. Id.
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ticular reasons why plaintiffs should not have used a hypergeometric test
demonstrates the Fourth Circuit's acceptance of the binomial distribution test
when calculating standard deviations to measure legal significance in employ-
ment discrimination cases. 8' As evidenced by the Fourth Circuit's decisions
in Federal Reserve Bank and Western Electric the court is correctly applying
the binomial distribution test to calculate standard deviations in assessing
statistical significance in Title VII cages.82
Although the Fourth Circuit correctly applied a binomial distribution test
to the statistical analysis in Federal Reserve Bank, the court incorrectly re-
jected a one-tailed test of statistical significance.8 3 In Little v. Master-Bilt Pro-
ducts, Inc.," the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi sanctioned the use of one-tailed significance tests in employment
81. Id. at 30,663. But see D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 8, 1983 Supp. at 104 (Supreme
Court never intended that courts apply two or three standard deviations test of Castaneda and
Hazelwood as rule of law). Baldus and Cole maintained that a court treats the two or three
standard deviations test of statistical significance as a rule of law when the court asks whether
an observed disparity satisfies the two or three standard deviations rule. Id. If a court treats
the two or three standard deviations test as a rule of law, plaintiff may establish a prima facie
case of discrimination by proving that an observed disparity exceeds two or three standard devia-
tions. Id. Baldus and Cole argue that courts should treat the two or three standard deviations
test as an aid to interpretation rather than as a rule of law. Id. Although the Federal Reserve
Bank court cited Baldus and Cole for the proposition that Castaneda and Hazelwood did not
establish the two or three standard deviations test as a rule of law, the Federal Reserve Bank
court applied the two or three standard deviations test as a rule of law. See 698 F.2d at 647
n.18; see also D. BALDuS & J. COLE, supra note 8 at 295 n.13 (application of two or three stan-
dard deviations test to employment discrimination cases requires caution and expert guidance).
Baldus and Cole argued that the Federal Reserve Bank court incorrectly rejected the
hypergeometric distribution formula in favor of a binomial distribution formula. See D. BALDUs
& J. CoIE, supra note 8, 1983 Supp. at 94 n.12 (criticizing Fourth Circuit's rejection of
hypergeometric distribution formula). The FederalReserve Bank court concluded that the replaced
sampling model applied to plaintiffs' employee population sample because the employer presumably
replaced any employee who terminated employment or who promoted to a higher pay grade.
Id. Baldus and Cole, however, argued that the replacement of individuals in plaintiffs' employee
population sample could not validate the replaced sampling model. Id. Baldus and Cole conclud-
ed that while a situation like the one presented in Federal Reserve Bank required a nonstandard
statistical analysis fashioned to fit the particular facts of the case, the Fourth Circuit should
have used a hypergeometric model because of the large size of the overall selection rate of in-
dividuals for promotion from the pool of eligibles. Id. In Federal Reserve Bank, the observed
number of promotions demonstrated an overall selection rate of 20% or more from the pool
of eligibles. Id. An overall selection rate of 20% corresponds to a five to one ratio between the
population and sample size. Id. at 93 n.ll. A hypergeometric formula produces more accurate
and reliable results than a binomial distribution at overall selection rates exceeding 20%. Id.
Baldus and Cole concluded that the replaced sampling model violates the without replacements
requirement of the hypergeometric model. Id. Using a hypergeometric model, however, violates
the without replacements requirement to a lesser extent than using a binomial distribution violates
the under 200 selection rate requirement. Id.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (defining proper use of binomial distribution
test).
83. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (arguing case for use of one-tailed test
of statistical significance in discrimination cases).
84. 506 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. Miss. 1980).
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discrimination cases."8 In Master-Bilt, the court held that a defendant refrigera-
tion products manufacturer discriminated against women employees in pro-
motion practices on the basis of sex.8 6 The Master-Bilt court held that a one-
tailed test of statistical significance was more appropriate than a two-tailed
test in employment discrimination cases because a court was concerned only
with discrimination against a protected group.87 The Master-Bilt court held
that a one-tailed test should be applied since the controversy concerned only
underrepresentation of female workers."8
Considering the Master-Bilt court's analysis the Fourth Circuit's holding
in Federal Reserve Bank rejecting a one-tailed test of statistical significance
is unnecessarily strict.8 9 The Fourth Circuit should recognize the logical ap-
plicability of a one-tailed test of significance to cases involving discrimination
against a particular group. Congress enacted Title VII to eliminate employ-
ment practices that discriminate against a protected group.9 ' Using a method
like the one-tailed test of statistical significance, which gives greater significance
to discrimination against a particular group, would greater effectuate the goals
of Title VII. 92
In Federal Reserve Bank, the Fourth Circuit promulgated standards of
statistical significance by which lower courts must assess the significance of
a litigant's evidence of employment discrimination.93 The Fourth Circuit's ruling
that statisticians and courts must apply a binomial distribution test when
calculating standard deviations demonstrates the Fourth Circuit's desire to stan-
dardize mathematical analyses used in Title VII actions litigated in the Fourth
85. Id. at 333.
86. Id. at 334.
87. Id. at 333.
88. Id.
89. See D. BALDUS & J. COLE, supra note 8, 1983 Supp. at 100-01 (Fourth Circuit's in-
dependent, discrimination requirement unnecessarily strict). Baldus and Cole criticized the Federal
Reserve Bank court's ruling that a litigant must establish an independent showing of discrimina-
tion before using a one-tailed test of statistical significance. Id. Baldus and Cole argued that
a one-tailed test is appropriate if the possibility of discrimination favoring the protected group
can be ruled out as illogical. Id. The system is either nondiscriminatory or discriminatory toward
the protected group. Id. If an observer can be certain of no discrimination in favor of plaintiff's
protected group, then any disproportionate impact favoring plaintiff may be attributed to chance.
Id. at n.38. Only discrimination against plaintiff's group, therefore, would assume significance.
Id. Since only discrimination against the protected group is significant, a one-tailed level of
significance may be used. Id.; see Kaye, The Numbers Game: Statistical Inference in Discrimina-
tion Cases, 80 MIcH. L. Rv. 833, 841 (1982) (arguing case for one-tailed test of statistical
significance).
90. See D. BALDus AND J. COLE, supra note 8, 1983 Supp. at 100-01 (one-tailed test logical
when measuring discrimination against a particular group).
91. See supra note I (purpose of Title VII).
92. See Little v. Master-Bilt Products, 506 F. Supp. 319, 333 (N.D. Miss. 1980) (evidence
that one-tailed test of statistical significance applies to discrimination hypothesis); see also supra
note I (purpose of Tide VII to achieve equality of employment opportunities).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 40-50 and 56-76 (Fourth Circuit's discussion of
appropriate tests of statistical significance in Title VII cases).
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Circuit.94 The Federal Reserve Bank decision should clarify an unsettled area
of legal decisionmaking and provide guidance to courts and contestants when
applying the principles borrowed from a non-legal discipline.
BRUCE MICHAEL HATRAK
D. Title VII and Fetal Protection
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' prohibits employment discrimina-
tion based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 Title VII prohibits
both intentional discrimination3 and the use of neutral employment policies
that disparately affect a protected class.' A Title VII plaintiff asserting that
an employer intentionally discriminated on a prohibited basis may sue under
either of two models which together comprise the disparate treatment theory
of Title VII liability2 The first, the covert disparate treatment model, focuses
on determining whether intentional discrimination formed the basis of an
employment decision., An employer may defend himself against a charge of
94. See Moultrie v. Martin, 690 F.2d 1078, 1082 (4th Cir. 1982) (mandatory application
of standard deviation analysis in discrimination cases will establish standard mathematical pro-
cedure). In Moultrie, the Fourth Circuit explicitly held that district courts must apply standard
deviation analysis to all racial discrimination cases to promulgate standard mathematical pro-
cedures. Id.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employ-
ment classifications based on race, sex, religion, color, or national origin if such classifications
constitute barriers that restrict equal employment opportunities. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
Title VII protects the employment opportunities of every individual, irrespective of whether the
employee's class is well represented in the workplace. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,
445-51 (1982); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 709 (1978). Title
VII protects both traditional minority and majority workers from discriminatory practices.
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279 (1976); see Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). A private employer, however, may institute an affirmative action
program in order to raise the minority level of representation in the workplace to the minority's
percentage of the local labor force. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 201-04
(1979). Title VII protects subgroups of protected classes if the employer discriminates only against
the subgroup and not the entire class. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544
(1971) (per curiam) (employer may not discriminate against women with school-aged children
even though employer does not discriminate against women generally).
3. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (employer who in-
tentionally discriminates against employee on account of race violates Title VII).
4. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (Title VII prohibits practices
which appear to be fair but are discriminatory in effect).
5. See Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Pro-
tection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under Title VII, 69 Gao. L.J. 641, 668-73 (1981)
(cases of intentional discrimination may be divided into categories of facial, or overt, discrimina-
tion and pretextual, or covert, discrimination).
6. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 51 U.S.L.W. 4354, 4355 (1983).
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covert disparate treatment by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for an employment decision." The second, the overt or facial discrimination
model, applies when the discriminatory character of an employment practice
is apparent or easily discerned.8 An employer may justify an overtly
discriminatory employment practice by proving that the practice constitutes
a bona fide occupational qualification (bfoq).9 A Title VII plaintiff may sue
The covert disparate treatment model focuses on whether the employer intentionally has treated
one or more employees less favorably than others because of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
The Supreme Court enunciated the standard for proving the existence of covert disparate treat-
ment in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas,
the employer denied reemployment to a former employee who had acted in a criminal manner
while protesting the employer's labor practices. Id. at 794-96. The McDonnell Douglas Court
held that a claimant could establish a prima facie case of covert disparate treatment by showing
that the job applicant was a member of a traditionally disadvantaged minority, that the applicant
was qualified for an available job, that the employer rejected the applicant, and that the job
remained open after the applicant's rejection. Id. at 802. The McDonnell Douglas model does
not require direct evidence of intent to discriminate. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 358 n.44; see Aikens,
51 U.S.L.W. at 4355 n.3 (plaintiff may prove intent to discriminate by introducing circumstantial
evidence of discrimination). Establishing the prima facie case gives rise to an inference of inten-
tional discrimination because common experience has shown that, absent another explanation,
discriminatory motive is the most likely cause of an applicant's rejection. Furnco Constr. Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579-80 (1978). The prima facie case of covert disparate treatment reduces
the likelihood that the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for an applicant's rejection formed
the basis of the employment decision. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248, 253-54 (1981).
7. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To rebut the prima
facie case of covert disparate treatment, the employer must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the employment action. Id. If the employer succeeds in articulating a legitimate reason
for his action, the plaintiff may still prove the existence of intentional discrimination by per-
suading the court that the articulation is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. at
804. Throughout the litigation, the claimant retains the burden of persuasion of the ultimate
issue of intentional discrimination. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
256 (1981); see United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 51 U.S.L.W. 4354, 4355
(1983) (when trial court has rendered judgment on ultimate issue of intent, appellate court may
not upset trial court's factual determination solely because of deficiencies in prima fade case).
8. See, e.g., Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 704 (1978)
(employer's requirement that female employees make larger contributions to pension plan than
male employees because of gender based actuarial tables constituted overt sex discrimination);
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 325-26 n.6 (1977) (employer's express segregation of male
and female prison guards on basis of sex constitutes overt discrimination); McDonald v. Santa
Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282-85 (1976) (overt discrimination occurred when employer
retained black employee but discharged white employee although both employees misappropriated
company supplies); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per curiam)
(overt sex discrimination occurred when employer refused to hire women with preschool-aged
children).
9. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332-37 (1977) (state employer may assert bona
fide occupational qualification (bfoq) as defense to charge of discrimination on the basis of sex
in hiring of prison guards); Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (per
curiam) (employer who discriminates against women must prove bfoq to avoid liability); 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(e) (1976) (bfoq must be reasonably nectssary to normal operation of employer's business
to justify discrimination on basis of religion, sex, or national origin). To establish a bfoq defense,
an employer must prove that the essence of the employer's business requires discrimination on
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under the disparate impact theory when a neutrally expressed employment
policy, which on its face does not appear to be discriminatory, unintentional-
ly results in a discriminatory effect on a protected class of employees.'" An
employer may defend himself against a charge of disparate impact by proving
that business necessity justified the policy." In Wright v. Olin Corp., 2 the
Fourth Circuit considered a Title VII claim that did not conform to any of
the established models of analysis. 3
In Olin, the defendant, Olin Corporation (Olin), instituted a fetal protec-
tion program purportedly to protect the health of Olin employees' offspring. 
4
the basis of religion, sex, or national origin. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d
385, 388 (5th Cir.) (bfoq justifies sex discrimination only when failure to discriminate would
undermine essence of business operation), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971); see also Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969) (to establish bfoq defense,
employer must have factual basis for believing that all women would be unable to perform job
safely).
10. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme
Court held that Title VII prohibits an employment practice that adversely affects a protected
class of employees in a disproportionate manner, irrespective of the apparent neutrality of the
practice. Id. The Title VII claimant will typically raise a prima facie case of disparate impact
by introducing statistical evidence showing that the representation of a protect class of employees
fails to meet the expected results of random selection from the qualified labor force. See EEOC
v. United Va. Bank/Seaboard Nat'l., 615 F.2d 147, 150 (4th Cir. 1980) (court must determine
disparate impact in light of qualified work force because general labor force statistics provide
inadequate basis for comparison). A finding of lack of randomness gives rise to the inference
that an impermissible classification entered into the employment decision. See EEOC v. American
Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1191 (4th Cir. 1981) (small probability of randomness confirms legal
inference of discrimination), cert. denied; 103 S.Ct. 235 (1982); Comment, Proper Methods of
Statistical Proof in Disparate Impact Cases of Title VII Litigation, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
665, 669 n.26 (1982) (statistically small probability of randomness in minority representation im-
plies discriminatory design).
11. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). An employer may rebut
a prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that business necessity justified the employ-
ment practice that led to disproportionate representation. Id. The test for business necessity applied
by the lower courts requires an employer to show that an overriding legitimate business purpose
justifies the practice in question. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). In addition, the employment practice must be necessary for
safety and efficiency and must carry on the business purpose effectively. Id. If the employer
succeeds in establishing that business necessity justified the employment practice, the plaintiff
then must prove that the asserted business necessity constituted a pretext for intentional discrimina-
tion. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979). See generally
Furnish, A Path Through the Maze: Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 After Beazer and Burdine, 23 B.C.L. Rav. 419 (1982) (discussing
structural similarities between disparate impact and disparate treatment models).
12. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982).
13. Id. at 1184; see infra notes 28-40 and accompanying text (discussing Olin court's choice
of Title VII model of analysis).
14. 697 F.2d at 1182. Olin Corporation (Olin) instituted its "female employment and fetal
vulnerability" program in Olin's Pisgah Forest plant after four years of planning. Id. The pro-
gram created three job classifications for women. Id. Unrestricted jobs, which presented no health
hazards to the fetus, were open to all women. Id. Controlled jobs, which presented some risk
of contact with harmful chemicals, were open to nonpregnant women. Id. Restricted jobs, which
required contact with known harmful chemicals, were closed to all fertile women. Id. Of the
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The fetal protection program excluded all fertile women from restricted job
categories that entailed risk of exposure to lead or other dangerous substances
used in the production of paper at Olin's Pisgah Forest Plant."5 For purposes
of the program, Olin assumed that any woman between five and sixty-three
years of age was fertile. 6 Olin would permit a woman in this age group to
work in restricted jobs only if Olin's medical staff would certify the woman's
sterility.II
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)'8 filed suit
265 job classifications at the Pisgah Forest plant, the fetal protection program categorized twelve
as restricted. Id. The program placed no restrictions on male employees. Id.
15. Id. Olin excluded women from jobs which entailed a risk of exposure to lead or other
teratogenic or abortifacient substances. Id. Teratogens and abortifacients comprise two of three
overlapping categories of substances that threaten human reproductive processes. See Note, Birth
Defects Caused by Parental Exposure to Workplace Hazards: The Interface of Title VII With
OSHA and Tort Law, 12 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 237, 239-40 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Birth Defects].
The first category, mutagens, affects the germ cells of exposed male and female adults prior
to conception. Id. at 239. Mutagens cause changes in the chromosomal structure of cells that
may be transmitted to future generations. Id. Single or repeated exposures to mutagens may result
in mutagenesis. Id. at 240. The effects of mutagenesis may not become apparent for decades
after the initial exposure. Id. Mutagenesis may result in fetal mortality, birth-defects, or miscar-
riage. Id. The second category of substances that threaten human reproduction, gametotoxins
and abortifacients, cause miscarriage or fetal malformation by damaging sperm or ova prior to
conception. Id. Teratogens, the third category, act on the embryo itself after conception. Id.
A teratogen is any substance which causes a functional deviation or structural deformity, not
heritable, in a developing embryo or fetus. 40 C.F.R. § 162.3 (mm) (1983). Teratogens generally
affect only the offspring of exposed female workers, but also may affect the offspring of a male
worker who exposes his spouse by carrying home trace amounts of teratogenic material on his
body or in his clothing. Birth Defects, supra at 240 & n.24. Teratogenesis may occur even if
a female employee has left the workplace prior to conceiving if sufficient time has not elapsed
to allow her system to detoxify. Id. at 240. A strictly teratogenic substance may affect the fetus
without harming either parent. See Nothstein & Ayres, Sex-Based Considerations of Differentia-
tion in the Workplace: Exploring The Biomedical Interface Between OSHA and Title VII, 26
Vi.L. L. REv. 239, 245 n.18 (1981). Teratogens differ from abortifacients and gametotoxins in
that a teratogen-affected infant frequently is born alive, while abortifacients and gametotoxins
cause spontaneous miscarriage. Id. Several commentators believe that an employer's fear of tort
liability to a teratogen-affected infant is the source of an employer's motivation to institute a
fetal protection plan. See id. at 293; infra note 94 and accompanying text (describing employer's
potential tort liability for causing harm to fetus).
16. 697 F.2d at 1182.
17. Id.
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976). Under Title VII, an employee who considers himself
or herself to be the subject of prohibited discrimination must file a claim with the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) before pursuing recourse in the courts. Id. § 2000e-5(e).
The employee must file his or her claim with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory
act. Id. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe that discrimination if present, the EEOC
will attempt to persuade the employer to cease the discriminatory practice through informal con-
ferences and conciliations. Id. § 2000e-5(b). If the EEOC's efforts at informal resolution fail,
the EEOC will issue a right to sue letter and the aggrieved employee may sue the employer directly.
Id. The EEOC will issue the notice of right to sue upon either dismissal of the administrative
charge, termination of conciliation proceedings, or lapse of 180 days from the employee's initial
filing of the charge. Id. § 2000e-5(e). The EEOC itself also may file a civil action against a private
employer. Id. § 2000e-5(f).
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against Olin alleging that Olin's fetal protection program violated Title VII
by intentionally discriminating against female employees. 19 The EEOC sought
to enjoin continuation of the program.2" At trial, Olin presented the testimony
of several employees who stated that Olin instituted the exclusionary policy
to protect the health of potential offspring of Olin employees.2 The United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held that Olin
did not institute the fetal protection program with the intent to discriminate
on the basis of sex and consequently held that Olin's fetal protection program
did not violate Title VII.22
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, the EEOC contended that the undisputed
evidence of Olin's gender based classification constituted a prima facie case
of overt discrimination.2 3 The EEOC asserted that the district court erred in
finding for Olin because Olin had failed to prove that infertility constituted
a bfoq.24 The EEOC argued that, in the alternative, the fetal protection pro-
gram resulted in a disparate impact on women. 5 Since Olin had failed to
establish at trial the business necessity of the program, the EEOC argued that
the district court erred by failing to find that Olin had violated Title VII. 26
Olin responded that the EEOC's factual assertions constituted at best a prima
facie case of covert disparate treatment requiring only that Olin articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the program to allow the program
to stand.27
19. EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 F.E.P. Cases 1646, 1649 (W.D.N.C. 1980). In addition to
charging that Olin's fetal protection program violated Title VII, the EEOC alleged that Olin
discriminated against blacks with respect to hiring, job assignments, promotions, terminations,
and re-employment, and against women with respect to re-employment. Id. at 1650. In the lawsuit
against Olin, the EEOC sought remedial and injunctive relief for the individual employees and
classes of employees named in the complaint. Id. at 1649. No employee alleged actual damage
as a result of Olin's fetal protection program. Id. The Olin district court consolidated the EEOC's
action with a class action brought by two Olin employees. See Wright v. Olin Corp., 24 F.E.P.
Cases 1615 (W.D.N.C. 1980). The district court found for Olin on all issues. 697 F.2d at 1176.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the majority
of the claims because the EEOC had failed to make a reasonable cause determination of discrimina-
tion before filing suit. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976) (EEOC must find reasonable cause
to believe discrimination occurred before taking any action against employer). The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the district court's determinations of all charges except the fetal protection plan
were not clearly erroneous and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment on those charges.
697 F.2d at 1180-81.
20. 24 F.E.P. Cases 1646, 1649 (W.D.N.C. 1980).
21. 697 F.2d at 1182. Olin's Corporate Director of Health Affairs, a medical doctor, testified
that Olin's Department of Hygiene and Toxicology had reviewed the relevant medical literature
in arriving at the conclusion that the fetal protection program was necessary to protect the health
of employees' future offspring. Id. Olin's Director of Safety Loss Prevention testified that no
feasible alternative to excluding fertile women was available to reduce the risk of fetal harm. Id.
22. 24 F.E.P. Cases 1646, 1659. The Olin district court found that Olin instituted the fetal
protection program for sound medical and humanitarian reasons, and not with the intent to
discriminate against women. Id.
23. 697 F.2d at 1183; see supra notes 8-9 (describing overt discrimination model).
24. 697 F.2d at 1183.
25. Id. at 1183-84; see supra notes 10-11 (describing disparate impact model).
26. 697 F.2d at 1183-84.
27. Id. at 1183; see supra notes 6-7 (describing covert disparate treatment model). On appeal
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The Fourth Circuit recognized that selecting the proper Title VII model
of analysis for Olin's fetal protection program was an issue of first impres-
sion in the federal courts. 28 The court noted that the fetal protection program
did not conform precisely with any of the existing Title VII models. 29 The
Olin court rejected the covert disparate treatment model as wholly inappropriate
for evaluating the validity under Title VII of the fetal protection program.
30
The court reasoned that the covert disparate treatment model applies only
when the employer denies that he considered gender as an employment factor,
the employer's intent is not manifest, and the employer's intent may only be
proven circumstantially.' The Fourth Circuit recognized that the EEOC based
its claim on the assertion that Olin's intention to treat female employees less
favorable than male employees was manifest in the very definition, of the
program. 32 The court further reasoned that analyzing the fetal protection pro-
gram as a case of covert disparate treatment would deny the EEOC the
opportunity to assert a disparate impact claim as an alternate theory.
3
Although the Olin court rejected covert disparate treatment as the analytical
model for a fetal protection plan, the court did not adopt the overt discrimina-
tion model.34 The court stated that the overt model, if adopted, would limit
Olin to the narrow bfoq defense. 3 The court suggested that Title VII did not
limit an employer to one defense, but permitted an employer to advance either
a business necessity or a bfoq defense.
6
to the Fourth Circuit, Olin contended that'it had articulated a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
for excluding fertile women from certain jobs. 697 F.2d at 1183. Olin also asserted that the EEOC
had failed to prove that Olin's articulated nondiscriminatory reason constituted a pretext for
intentional discrimination. Id.
28. 697 F.2d at 1184.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1185.
31. Id. at 1185 n.20.
32. Id.
33. Id. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that treating the covert disparate treatment model as
the exclusive model of analysis would interfere with the EEOC's right to pursue a disparate im-
pact claim. Id. The court noted that the disparate impact and disparate treatment models con-
stitute settled alternative bases of liability. Id.
34. See id. at 1185.
35. Id. at 1185 n.21.
36. Id. The Olin court's holding that an employer may assert the Title VII defenses of
bfoq and business necessity interchangeably is not supported by the decisions of other courts.
Factual situations may arise that justify the plaintiff's pursuit of both disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977) (both disparate impact and disparate treatment theories may apply to a particular set of
facts); Wright v. National Archives & Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 711 (4th Cir. 1979) (disparate
impact and disparate treatment theories may provide alternate grounds for relief in same case).
No court, however, has permitted an employer to select defenses at the employer's will. See
Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650, 653 (5th Cir.) (courts generally
have assumed that business necessity defense applies only to cases of disparate impact), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980). In Miller, the employer assigned the plaintiff, a black man, to in-
spect only barber shops operated by blacks and discharged the plaintiff for seeking to inspect
shops operated by whites. Id. at 651. The Miller court found that the work assignment con-
stituted intentional discrimination on the basis of race. Id. at 652. The court recognized that
because the statutorily created bfoq exception does not permit discrimination on the basis of
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The Fourth Circuit found that the disparate impact model most closely
accommodated the unique characteristics of the fetal protection program.1
7
The court recognized that the facial neutrality of Olin's fetal protecion pro-
gram was questionable, but nevertheless adopted the disparate impact model.3 8
race or color, the bfoq defense could not justify discrimination against the plaintiff. Id. The
Fifth Circuit, furthermore, rejected the employer's business necessity defense on the grounds that
the business necessity defense applies only when the plaintiff has established a prima facie case
of disparate impact. Id. at 653; see Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search
for Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376, 385 (1981) (business necessity defense may justify
only neutral rules whereas bfoq defense may justify intentionally discriminatory employment prac-
tices). But see deLaurier v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1978)
(business necessity defense may rebut any prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII).
In deLaurier, the employer required the plaintiff, a female school teacher, to take maternity leave
at the beginning of her ninth month of pregnancy. Id. at 676. Although the deLaurier court
stated that the business necessity defense could rebut any prima facie case, the court implicitly
found that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy constituted disparate impact discrimination.
See id. at 677 (deLaurier court relied on disparate impact cases to determine existence of prima
facie case). The deLaurier court's statements regarding the interchangeability of Title VII defenses
therefore represent dicta because the business necessity defense normally applies to disparate im-
pact cases. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (describing business necessity defense). Cf.
Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (business necessity may justify disparate
impact on women resulting from discrimination on basis of pregnancy).
The only Supreme Court opinion that addresses both the bfoq and business necessity defenses
implicitly distinguishes bfoq from business necessity. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329-34 (1977). In Dothard, the Supreme Court applied the business necessity defense to an employer's
minimum height and weight requirements which had a disparate impact on women. See id. at
332-33. The Court also applied the bfoq defense to the employer's disparate treatment of female
prison guards. See id. at 332-34. The Fourth Circuit, however, previously has stated in dicta
that the bfoq and business necessity defenses are not necessarily mutually exclusive. See Burwell
v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 370 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (1981). In Burwell, the court held that an airline's discrimination against pregnant flight
attendants constitutes a prima facie case of disparate impact against women. Id. at 369. The
Burwell court, however, exonerated the airline by applying the business necessity defense. Id.
at 370, 371-73; see infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text (describing Burwell court's business
necessity criteria). The Burwell court found that the bfoq defense was unnecessary since the business
necessity defense was sufficient to resolve the case. 633 F.2d at 370. The court therefore refused
to decide whether the employer could have asserted bfoq as an additional defense to a case of
disparate impact. Id. Although the Burwell court refused to apply the bfoq defense to a disparate
impact case, the court conjectured that a case might occur in which selection of a single Title
VII theory would lead to confusion. Id. at 370 n.16. The could held that when confusion exists,
Title VII permits the application of either the bfoq or the business necessity defense except in
race discrimination cases. Id.; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976) (bfoq defense applies only to
discrimination based on religion, sex, or national origin). Although the dicta in Burwell indicates
that the bfoq and business necessity defenses are interchangeable in sex discrimination cases,
the Burwell court focused on whether the bfoq defense could apply to a case of disparate impact
and did not discuss whether the business necessity defense could apply to a disparate treatment
case. See id. at 369-70; see also Comment, Pregnancy Discrimination under Title VII, 38 WAsH.
& LEE L. REv. 633, 642-43 (1981) (asserting that Fourth Circuit should have analyzed Burwell
as disparate treatment case and should have applied bfoq defense only).
37. 697 F.2d at 1185.
38. Id. In deciding to analyze the fetal protection program in terms of disparate impact,
the Olin court relied upon the Supreme Court's analysis in Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty. Id. at
1186-87; see Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (denial of accumulated seniority
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The court determined that the underlying principles of Title VII focus on the
consequences of discrimination and not on the form in which an employer
expresses the policy. 9 The Fourth Circuit found that, irrespective of the facial
neutrality of the program's terms, the fetal protection program's disparate
impact on women constituted a prima facie violation of Title VII.
4 °
Having chosen to analyze Olin's program as a case of disparate impact,
the Fourth Circuit proceeded to remand the case for retrial in the district court
and to define the nature of the business necessity defense that Olin would
have to establish on retrial.4 ' The court emphasized that an employer may
not exclude female workers from the workplace to protect the female workers
themselves, but may exclude women to protect their potential offspring.42 The
court recognized that the business necessity defense permits an employer to
adopt an apparently neutral policy that disparately affects women if the pur-
pose of the policy is to ensure the safety of business customers or fellow
workers. 3 The Fourth Circuit reasoned by analogy that an employee's child
deserved an equivalent level of protection.44 The court found that the national
interest in the health of members of society could justify the employer's pur-
suit of a policy that excludes women from the workplace. 45 The court noted
that since the general societal interest in fetal health constituted a sufficient
basis for a business necessity defense, the employer's motivation to avoid poten-
tial tort liability was irrelevant."" The Olin court held that under appropriate
circumstances an employer, as a matter of business necessity, could impose
restrictions that were reasonably required to protect the health of unborn
children of female workers against workplace hazards.47
The Olin court stated that an employer who defends a fetal protection
program must introduce objective evidence that shows the necessity and
effectiveness of the program.4 The court held that to prove necessity, an
during maternity leave constitutes disparate impact on women); infra notes 70-75 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Satty).
39. 697 F.2d at 1186.
40. Id. at 1186-87.
41. Id. at 1187-92. Prior to defining the nature of the business necessity defense, the Olin
court noted that in the absence of specific congressional guidance, courts must determine con-
gressional intent and not fashion policy. Id. at 1188.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1188-89.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1190 n.26. In permitting an employer to pursue the goal of fetal safety, the Olin
court noted that the general goal of fetal protection does not justify the exclusion of women
in an individual case. Id. The court warned that each employer must prove that a fetal protection
plan is both necessary and effective in that employer's specific workplace. Id; see infra notes
48-52 and accompanying text (describing necessity and effectiveness criteria).
46. 697 F.2d at 1190 n.26. In rejecting the threat of tort liability as a basis for a fetal
protection plan, the Fourth Circuit recognized that economic cost alone is insufficient to establish
a justification defense. Id.; see Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
716-17 (1978) (cost savings does not justify discrimination).
47. 697 F.2d at 1189-90.
48. Id. at 1190. In requiring an employer to show the necessity and effectiveness of an
employment policy that disparately affects women, the Fourth Circuit stated that the employer
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employer must show that such a considerable body of expert opinion predicts
risk to the fetus that an informed and responsible employer could not fail
to act. 9 To prove effectiveness, the employer must show that excluding women
actually protects the health of the unborn child.5 0 The court held, however,
that the employer need not prove that a general consensus of expert opinion
regarding the necessity and effectiveness of the program exists.' The Fourth
Circuit held that proof of necessity and effectiveness constitutes a prima facie
business necessity defense.-
2
The Olin court held that a Title VII plaintiff could rebut the prima facie
business necessity defense by showing the availability of alternative practices
that would accomplish the employer's objectives with less impact on female
employees. 3 The court held that a claimant's showing of less restrictive alter-
natives could lead to two different results. 4 The existence of a less restrictive
must rely primarily on expert scientific testimony. Id. The court noted that the evidence presented
at trial by Olin's three witnesses was insufficient to meet the employer's burden of proving necessity
and effectiveness. Id. at 1190 n.28; see supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing nature
of evidence that Olin presented at trial).
The Olin court adopted the criteria expressed in Robinson v. Lorillard for determining necessity
and effectiveness. See id. at 1190; Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971). The Lorillard court held that an employment practice that
results in disparate impact on a protected class is permissible under Title VII only if the practice
meets three criteria. Id. First, the practice must be necessary to ensure the safe and efficient
operation of the business. Id. Second, the practice must effectively carry out the purpose which
it is alleged to serve. Id.
The third Lorillard criterion requires that the employer prove that no acceptable alternative
policies exist which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced. Id. The Olin
court,however, found that Supreme Court cases decided subsequently to Lorillard implicitly overrule
the Lorillard requirement that the employer show the nonexistence of acceptable alternatives.
697 F.2d at 1191 n.29; see New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979)
(claimant bears ultimate burden of proving violation of Title VII); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (once employer shows job-relatedness of practice, claimant must show
existence of acceptable nonrestrictive alternatives to prove pretext); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 329 (1977) (same). Consequently, the Olin court applied only the necessity and effec-
tiveness criteria expressed in Lorillard. See 697 F.2d at 1190.
49. 697 F.2d at 1191. In requiring an employer to present objective evidence and expert
testimony, the Olin court emphasized the fact that evidence of the employer's good faith was
irrelevant to proving business necessity. Id. at 1190.
50. Id. at 1190 & n.27. In placing the burden to prove effectiveness upon the employer,
the Olin court required the employer to prove that workplace exposure of the male employee
does not pose the same risk to the fetus that exposure of the female employee poses. Id. at 1190
n.27. The court stated that a fetal protection program that fails to protect fetuses from the risk
of harm due to the exposure of male workers is underinclusive and therefore fails for lack of
effectiveness. Id. The potential for underinclusiveness constituted the focus of the attack on
Olin's fetal protection plan. See Reply Brief of ACLU, Amici Curiae at 17-24, Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (1982) (exposure of male employees to mutagenic substances poses equivalent
risk of harm to fetus as does exposure of female employees). See generally Williams, supra note
5, at 656 (exposure of either parent to mutagenic substances prior to conception may harm fetus).
51. 697 F.2d at 1190.





alternative may lead to a finding that the asserted business purpose constituted
a pretext for intentional discrimination. 5 In contrast, a court may find that
the existence of a less restrictive alternative implies that the exclusionary policy
was a genuine, although excessive attempt to assure fetal well-being.5 6 The
Fourth Circuit noted that if the trial court were to find that the policy was
merely excessive, the proper remedy would be to award damages for the dif-
ference between the harm that the female employee suffered under the policy
and the harm that she would have suffered under the less restrictive
alternative." If the rebuttal evidence were to show pretext, however, the pro-
per remedy would compensate the excluded female employee for the full
amount of harm suffered.5 8
The Fourth Circuit's rejection of the covert disparate treatment model
is consistent with Supreme Court precedent." In McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green,6 the Supreme Court designed the covert disparate treatment model
to determine from circumstantial evidence whether an employer intentionally
discriminated against employees on the basis of a prohibited classification. 6'
In McDonnell Douglas, such a model was necessary since only the employer
could know the actual criterion on which the employer based his refusal to
rehire a former employee. 62 In Olin, however, the employer plainly stated that
childbearing capacity was the criterion upon which the company excluded cer-
tain employees from jobs that entailed risk of exposure to dangerous
chemicals. 63 The EEOC did not allege that Olin based its exclusion of women
on any basis other than childbearing capacity. 6 The EEOC, rather, challenged
the validity of using childbearing capacity as an employment criterion and
alleged that discrimination on the basis of childbearing capacity constituted
overt gender discrimination."
The Olin court's rejection of the overt discrimination model is consistent
with Supreme Court precedent only if discrimination on the basis of child-
bearing capacity is not equivalent to discrimination on the basis of gender.
66
55. Id. at 1192.
56. See id. at 1191. Although the Fourth Circuit held that the existence of less restrictive
alternatives could lead to a finding of either intentional discrimination or excessive unintentional
discrimination, the Olin court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has not resolved this issue.
Id. at 1191 n.30.
57. Id. at 1190.
58. Id. at 1192.
59. See infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of covert disparate
treatment model to Olin).
60. 411 U.S. 792 (1973); see supra note 6 (discussion of McDonnell Douglas).
61. 411 U.S. at 802.
62. See id. at 801.
63. 697 F.2d at 1182; see supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text (discussing nature of
Olin's fetal protection program).
64. 697 F.2d at 1183.
65. Id.
66. See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's and Con-
gress' approach to pregnancy discrimination); see also Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136,
14041 (1977) (disparate impact model rather than overt discrimination model applied since
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In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,67 the Supreme Court permitted an employer
to exclude pregnancy benefits from a comprehensive group disability plan.6"
The Court reasoned that the policy wa not based on gender but on the condi-
tion of pregnancy and, therefore, did not violate Title VII.6 9 In Nashville Gas
Co. v. Satty,7 the Supreme Court similarly concluded that discrimination on
the basis of pregnancy was not overt gender discrimination. 7' In Satty, the
employer denied accumulated seniority to female employees returning from
pregnancy leave, but permitted employees returning from other disability leaves
to retain seniority.72 The Satty Court found that a policy based on pregnancy
was related to a medical condition and not to gender. 73 Because the Satty Court
did not consider discrimination on the basis of pregnancy to be equivalent
to gender discrimination, the Satty Court rejected the overt discrimination
model.7 4 The Court, however, found that because the policy imposed a burden




In response to the Supreme Court's opinion that pregnancy discrimina-
tion did not constitute overt gender discrimination, Congress enacted the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act. 76 The Act provides that discrimination on the
basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions constitutes overt
discrimination. 77 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act, however, does not specify
whether an employment decision based on childbearing capacity constitutes
discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. 78 Whether discrimination on the basis
discrimination on basis of pregnancy constitutes neutral employment classification and not overt
sex discrimination).
67. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
68. Id. at 128-33. In General Electric v. Gilbert, the employer excluded pregnancy benefits
from a comprehensive group disability plan which paid disabled employees 60% of their normal
earnings. Id. at 128. The employer included in coverage all temporary disabilities except pregnancy.
Id. at 129 n.4.
69. Id. at 139-40.
70. 434 U.S. 136 (1977).
71. Id. at 140.
72. Id. at 138.
73. Id. at 140.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 142-43. In Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, the court found that denial of accumulated
seniority to women who took pregnancy leaves of absence resulted in a disparate impact on women.
Id. The Court found that the employer had failed to prove the business necessity of the seniority
policy and therefore held that the employer had violated Title VII. Id. at 143.
76. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp.
III 1979)); see H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4749, 4753 (rationale of Gilbert and Satty is inconsistent with congressional intent).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. III 1979).
78. See id. (discrimination on basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions
constitutes sex discrimination); H.R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-7, reprinted in 1978
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4749, 4750-54. The legislative history of the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act indicates that employers consider women to be marginal workers based on the common
misconceptions that pregnant women are malingerers and will leave the workforce, and that pregnan-
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of childbearing capacity constitutes overt gender discrimination under the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, therefore, still is unresolved." Discrimination
based on childbearing capacity, however, like discrimination based on
pregnancy, results in a heavier burden on women than on men. 0 The disparate
impact model, therefore, is an appropriate model for evaluating the validity
of a fetal protection program.8' Consequently, Olin was entitled to establish
a business necessity defense."'
The Fourth Circuit's definition of the business necessity defense constitutes
the first attempt by a federal court to determine the validity of a fetal protec-
tion plan that excludes fertile women from the workplace.8 3 The Supreme Court
cy will constitute an additional expense to company health plans. See H.R. REP. No. 948 at
3-7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4750-54.
79. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text (Pregnancy Discrimination Act focuses
on preventing discrimination based on stereotypic misconceptions about pregnancy); see also H.
R. REP. No. 948, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEvs
4749, 4753 (Pregnancy Discrimination Act is limited to discriminatory effects upon woman who
is pregnant and does not include effect upon one woman due to pregnancy of another). Wright
v. Olin Corp. is the first case dealing with an employment policy in which childbearing capacity
constituted the sole employment criterion. See 697 F.2d at 1184 (no court other than Olin court
has addressed legality of fetal protection plan); infra note 83 and accompanying text (Olin is
case of first impression).
80. Cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1977) (employment policy that
discriminates on basis of pregnancy is facially neutral but may result in disparate impact); Zuniga
v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1982) (exclusion of pregnant x-ray technician
constituted case of disparate impact under Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Clanton v. Orleans
Parish School, 649 F.2d 1084, 1086 (5th Cir. 1981) (discretionary reinstatement policy for mater-
nity leave results in disparate impact on women).
81. See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text (discrimination on basis of childbearing
capacity does not clearly constitute overt discrimination but does result in disparate impact on
women).
82. Cf. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136, 143 (1977) (business necessity justifies
neutral policy that results in disparate impact on women).
83. See 697 F.2d at 1184 (no court other than Olin court has addressed legality of fetal
protection plan); see also Bertin, Workplace Bias Takes the Form of Fetal Protectionism, Legal
Times of Washington, August 1, 1983 at 18 col. 1 (although many petrochemical companies and
heavy industries have fetal protection programs, Olin represents first federal case on fetal protec-
tion issue); Stohner & Underhill, 'Olin' Debates Title VII Applicability to Fetal Rights, Legal
Times of Washington, April 18, 1983 at 24 col. 1 (Olin decision will provide guidelines for other
courts).
Two weeks prior to the Olin decision, the Fifth Circuit decided that an employer who had
discharged a pregnant x-ray technician purportedly to protect the health of the employee's fetus
had violated Title VII. See Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hospital, 692 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1982)
(Although employer had maternity and sick leave policies, employer forced pregnant x-ray technician
to resign). The Zuniga court used disparate impact analysis and applied the business necessity
defense because the facts in Zuniga occurred prior to the effective date of the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act. Id. at 989 n.6. The Zuniga court held that the forced resignation on the basis of pregnancy
constituted a prima faie case of disparate impact discrimination. Id. at 991. The Fifth Circuit
refused to decide whether the employer's desire to protect the health of an employee's unborn
child could constitute business necessity. Id. at 992. The court did note in dictum, however, that
the economic consequences of a tort suit brought on behalf of a child deformed by prenatal
x-rays could disrupt the safe and efficient operation of the hospital. Id. at 992 n. 10. The Zuniga
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has defined only in general terms the scope of the business necessity defense.8"
The Supreme Court's discussions of business necessity have focused on the
relationship between the challenged employment practice and the employee's
job performance. 5 Lower federal courts generally have concluded that the
pursuit of safety and efficiency in an employee's job performance is the only
permissible goal of an employment practice that impinges on Title VII
interests.
8 6
Under the business necessity defense, courts consider the safety of business
customers and fellow employees as a legitimate goal of employment practices
that disparately affect a protected class of employees. For example, in Burwell
court held that irrespective of the existence of business necessity, the hospital's failure to follow
its own maternity and sick leave policies constituted proof of pretext. Id. at 992-94; cf. supra
notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Olin court's treatment of less restrictive alter-
natives to fetal protection program).
Four months prior to the Olin decision, the district court for the Northern District of Alabama
held that a hospital's dismissal of a pregnant x-ray technician constituted intentional discrimina-
tion. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 546 F. Supp. 259, 262-63 (N.D. Ala. 1982). Based
on the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, the Hayes court found that discrimination on the basis
of pregnancy constituted overt discrimination. Id. The Hayes court, however, did not specify
whether the bfoq or business necessity defense applied. See id. at 263. The Hayes court held
that neither defense justified firing the pregnant x-ray technician because the employer had failed
to pursue less restrictive alternatives to dismissal. Id. at 264-65. In discussing business necessity,
however, the court noted in dictum that potential tort liability could not justify discrimination.
Id. at 264; cf. supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text (discussing Olin court's treatment of
less restrictive alternatives to fetal protection plan).
84. See infra note 85 and accompanying text (citing cases in which Supreme Court has
defined business necessity defense requirements).
85. See New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (employment
policy that promotes rail passenger safety bears manifest relation to employment in question).
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (ability test that has disparate impact
on protected class must bear manifest relation to employment in question); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (written employment test that has disparate impact on protected
class must be reasonable measure of job performance).
86. See, e.g., Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.) (employer must
show job relatedness, business utility, and lack of suitable alternatives that have less disparate
impact on protected class to sustain business necessity defense), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976);
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (business necessity
defense requires that employment policy serves more important goal than mere legitimate manage-
ment function); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.) (policy that disparately
affects a protected class of employees must be necessary to safe and efficient operation of business
to sustain business necessity defense), cert. dismissed, 424 U.S. 1006 (1971); Johnson v. Pike
Corp. of Am., 332 F. Supp. 490, 495 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (employee's ability to perform job effec-
tively is sole permissible reason for discriminating against actual or prospective employees); see
also Comment, The Business Necessity Defense to Disparate-Impact Liability Under Title VII,
46 U.CHI. L. REv. 911, 920 (1979) (test enunciated in Robinson v. Lorillard has been adopted
by majority of lower courts).
87. See, e.g., New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 & n.31 (1979)
(safety of metrorail passengers justified refusal to hire former drug addicts); Burwell v. Eastern
Air Lines, 633 F.2d 361, 371-72 (4th Cir. 1980) (safety of airline passengers justified flight atten-
dants' mandatory maternity leave after thirteenth week of pregnancy), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
965 (1981); Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 219 (10th Cir. 1972) (safety of airline
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v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.," the Fourth Circuit approved an airline's exclu-
sion of pregnant airline attendants from flight duty.89 The Burwell court
recognized that passenger safety is an essential goal of an airline and that
the exclusion of pregnant attendants is sufficiently related to that goal.9" The
Burwell court rejected as unpersuasive the employer's alternate goal of pro-
tecting the health of the pregnant attendant and her unborn child, especially
since flight posed little risk of harm to the fetus. 9 ' By limiting its holding
to a determination that a flight attendant's job included furtherance of
passenger safety, the Burwell court maintained conformity with the general
definition of business necessity. 92
In Wright v. Olin Corp., the Fourth Circuit held that the business necessity
defense does not require a link between an employment practice and job
performance.9 The Olin court decided that general societal concern for the
health of unborn generations may justify a practice thdt interferes with the
Title VII interests of a large class of employees.94 The Fourth Circuit's opin-
ion, therefore, has expanded the scope of the business necessity defense.9' The
court, however, tempered its expansion of the business necessity defense by
imposing on the employer a stringent burden to prove necessity and
passengers justified refusal to hire applicants for flight officer training program who lacked fly-
ing experience). See generally Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Ade-
quate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376 (1981).
88. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
89. Id. at 373. In Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., an airline required that flight atten-
dants commence maternity leave as soon as the attendant learned that she was pregnant. Id.
at 365. The airline did not exclude employees from flight duty for any other health conditions
that might have interferred with the employee's job performance. Id. The airline contended that
a pregnant flight attendant would pose a safety risk during an emergency because the attendant
would be unable to perform her duties. Id. at 365-66. The Burwell court noted that the flight
attendant's emergency duties included lifting heavy objects and assisting passengers through nar-
row aisles and portals. Id. at 366.
90. Id. at 373. In recognizing that the exclusion of pregnant attendants is related sufficient-
ly to the goal of passenger safety, the Burwell court reasoned that advanced stages of pregnancy
would interfere with an attendant's ability to perform her job. Id. at 373.
91. Id. at 371.
92. Compare Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361, 373 (1980) (en banc) (airlines's
mandatory maternity leave policy was necessary to safe and efficient operation of business) with
New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (legitimate employment goals
of safety and efficiency justify refusal to hire former drug users).
93. 697 F.2d at 1189-90.
94. Id. at 1190 n.26. By basing the legitimacy of the goal of fetal protection on broad
societal grounds, the Fourth Circuit obviates the need for the employer to justify the fetal protec-
tion plan solely in terms of reducing potential tort liability to the fetus. Id.; cf. Note, Employ-
ient Rights of Women in the Toxic Workplace, 65 CAL. L. REv. 1113, 1132 (1977) (potential
for enormous tort liability is actual motivation for fetal protection plans). Tort law is several
jurisdictions currently allows a child who is injured as a result of maternal exposure to harmful
elements to recover damages from the responsible party even though the exposure occurred prior
to the child's conception. See generally Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 15, at 293 n.244 (catalogu-
ing literature and cases concerning tort liability for preconception injury to fetus).
95. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (circuit courts consistently have required that
exclusionary employment practices relate to employee's ability to perform job).
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